

Ordering Default Theories

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Comparing different theories: first-order logic

- In first-order logic, a theory T_1 is **stronger** than another theory T_2 if every formula derived from T_2 is also derived from T_1 , i.e.

$$T_1 \models T_2 \text{ and } T_2 \not\models T_1$$

- For instance, $T_1 = \{ \textit{bird}, \textit{bird} \rightarrow \textit{flies} \}$ is stronger than $T_2 = \{ \textit{bird} \vee \textit{flies} \}$.

Comparing different theories: Default Logic

$$T_1 = \{ \textit{bird}, \textit{bird} \rightarrow \textit{flies} \},$$

$$T_3 = \{ \textit{bird}, \frac{\textit{bird} : \textit{flies}}{\textit{flies}} \}$$

- The fact *flies* derived from T_1 is a **definite** conclusion, while *flies* from T_3 is a **default** conclusion.
- Two theories have the same extension, but conclusions derived from T_1 are **stronger** than those of T_3 .

Ordering Default Theories: Motivation

- In FOL theories are ordered by logical entailment. In DL extensions of theories are not helpful for judging relative strength between theories.
- To order default theories based on their information contents, it is necessary to **distinguish different sorts of information** derived from a theory.

Ordering Default Theories: Effect

- Comparing information contents of different theories is important to know relative value between theories.
- When there exist multiple sources of information as in **multi-agent systems**, it provides a yardstick for preference.
- It has potential application to the theory of **induction in nonmonotonic logics** and **nonmonotonic ILP**.


Default Logic

- A **default theory** is a pair $\Delta = (D, W)$ where D is a set of default rules and W is a set of first-order formulas.
- Given a default theory Δ , a formula is a **credulous conclusion** if it belongs to some (but not all) extensions of Δ .
A formula is a **skeptical conclusion** if it belongs to all extensions of Δ .

9-valued Logic

- The logic $I\mathcal{X}$ has the nine truth values t (true), f (false), \top (contradictory), \perp (undefined), dts (skeptically true by default), dfs (skeptically false by default), dtc (credulously true by default), dfc (credulously false by default), $*$ (contradictory by default).

A bilattice for logic \mathcal{LX}



9-valued Interpretation of Default Theories

Let $\Delta = (D, W)$ be a default theory and $EXT(\Delta)$ the set of all extensions of Δ . Given a propositional formula F , define the mapping ϕ_Δ as

$$\phi_\Delta(F) = \begin{cases} t & \text{if } EXT(\Delta) \neq \emptyset \text{ and } W \models F; \\ f & \text{if } EXT(\Delta) \neq \emptyset \text{ and } W \models \neg F; \end{cases}$$

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$$\phi_{\Delta}(F) = \begin{cases} \mathit{dts} & \text{if } \text{EXT}(\Delta) \neq \phi, W \models F \\ & \text{and } \forall E \in \text{EXT}(\Delta), F \in E; \\ \mathit{dfs} & \text{if } \text{EXT}(\Delta) \neq \phi, W \models \neg F \\ & \text{and } \forall E \in \text{EXT}(\Delta), \neg F \in E; \\ \mathit{dtc} & \text{if } \exists E \in \text{EXT}(\Delta) \text{ s.t. } F \in E \\ & \text{and } \exists E' \in \text{EXT}(\Delta) \text{ s.t. } F \notin E'; \\ \mathit{dfc} & \text{if } \exists E \in \text{EXT}(\Delta) \text{ s.t. } \neg F \in E \\ & \text{and } \exists E' \in \text{EXT}(\Delta) \text{ s.t. } \neg F \notin E'; \\ \perp & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

We write $\phi_{\Delta}(F) = \mathbf{T}$ if $\phi_{\Delta}(F) = \mathit{t}$ and $\phi_{\Delta}(F) = \mathit{f}$;
 and $\phi_{\Delta}(F) = *$ if $\phi_{\Delta}(F) = \mathit{dtc}$ and $\phi_{\Delta}(F) = \mathit{dfc}$.

Example

$$\Delta : \textit{bird}, \frac{\textit{bird} : \textit{flies}}{\textit{flies}}$$

$$E = \textit{Th}(\{ \textit{bird}, \textit{flies} \}).$$

$$\phi_{\Delta}(\textit{bird}) = \textit{t},$$

$$\phi_{\Delta}(\textit{flies}) = \textit{dts},$$

$$\phi_{\Delta}(\textit{bird} \rightarrow \textit{flies}) = \textit{dts}, \textit{ etc}$$

Example

$$\Delta : \frac{\neg rh - broken \wedge lh - broken}{lh - broken} \quad , \quad \frac{\neg lh - broken \wedge rh - broken}{rh - broken}$$

$$E_1 = Th(\{ lh - broken \})$$

$$E_2 = Th(\{ rh - broken \})$$

$$\phi_{\Delta}(lh - broken) = \phi_{\Delta}(rh - broken) = \mathbf{dtc} ,$$

$$\phi_{\Delta}(lh - broken \vee rh - broken) = \mathbf{dts} ,$$

$$\phi_{\Delta}(lh - broken \wedge rh - broken) = \perp , \quad \text{etc}$$

Example

$\Delta : \textit{quaker} \wedge \textit{republican}$

$\textit{quaker} : \textit{pacifist}$
 $\textit{pacifist}$

$\textit{republican} : \neg \textit{pacifist}$
 $\neg \textit{pacifist}$

,

$E_1 = Th(\{ \textit{quaker} \wedge \textit{republican}, \textit{pacifist} \})$

$E_2 = Th(\{ \textit{quaker} \wedge \textit{republican}, \neg \textit{pacifist} \})$

$\phi_{\Delta}(\textit{quaker} \wedge \textit{republican}) = \mathbf{t}$,

$\phi_{\Delta}(\textit{pacifist}) = *$, etc

Some Properties

- $\phi_{\Delta}(\neg F) = \neg \phi_{\Delta}(F)$
- $\phi_{\Delta}(F) \geq_k \phi_{\Delta}(G)$ iff $\phi_{\Delta}(\neg F) \geq_k \phi_{\Delta}(\neg G)$
- $\phi_{\Delta}(F) \geq_t \phi_{\Delta}(G)$ iff $\phi_{\Delta}(\neg G) \geq_t \phi_{\Delta}(\neg F)$
- $\neg(\phi_{\Delta}(F) \vee \phi_{\Delta}(G)) = \neg \phi_{\Delta}(F) \wedge \neg \phi_{\Delta}(G)$
- $\neg(\phi_{\Delta}(F) \wedge \phi_{\Delta}(G)) = \neg \phi_{\Delta}(F) \vee \neg \phi_{\Delta}(G)$
- $\phi_{\Delta}(F \vee G) \geq_t \phi_{\Delta}(F) \vee \phi_{\Delta}(G)$
- $\phi_{\Delta}(F \wedge G) \leq_t \phi_{\Delta}(F) \wedge \phi_{\Delta}(G)$
- $\phi_{\Delta}(F \rightarrow G) \geq_t \phi_{\Delta}(\neg F) \vee \phi_{\Delta}(G)$

Order Relation between Default Theories

- Given two default theories Δ_1 and Δ_2 , Δ_1 is **stronger** than Δ_2 (written $\Delta_2 \leq_{DL} \Delta_1$) if $\phi_{\Delta_2}(F) \leq_K \phi_{\Delta_1}(F)$ for any formula F in the language.
- We write $\Delta_1 =_{DL} \Delta_2$ if $\Delta_1 \leq_{DL} \Delta_2$ and $\Delta_2 \leq_{DL} \Delta_1$.
- Intuitively, $\Delta_2 \leq_{DL} \Delta_1$ means that Δ_1 has **more certain** information than Δ_2 .

Reduction to FOL

For two default theories $\Delta_1 = (\phi, W_1)$
and $\Delta_2 = (\phi, W_2)$,

$$\Delta_2 \leq_{DL} \Delta_1 \text{ iff } W_1 \models W_2.$$

- The relation \leq_{DL} is a natural extension of the one for first-order theories.

Order Equivalence

Given two default theories Δ_1 and Δ_2 ,
 $\Delta_1 =_{DL} \Delta_2$ implies $Ext(\Delta_1) = Ext(\Delta_2)$,
but not vice-versa.

- The order-equivalence relation $=_{DL}$ is **stronger** than the equivalence based on extensions.

Example

$\Delta_1: \textit{bird}, \textit{bird} \rightarrow \textit{flies},$

$\Delta_2: \textit{bird}, \frac{\textit{bird} : \textit{flies}}{\textit{flies}}$

$\phi_{\Delta_1}(\textit{bird}) = \phi_{\Delta_2}(\textit{bird}) = t, \phi_{\Delta_1}(\textit{flies}) = t,$
 $\phi_{\Delta_2}(\textit{flies}) = \textit{dts}.$ Then, $\Delta_2 \leq_{\text{DL}} \Delta_1.$

Next, given

$\Delta_3: \textit{bird}, \frac{: \textit{bird} \rightarrow \textit{flies}}{\textit{bird} \rightarrow \textit{flies}},$

it holds that $\Delta_2 =_{\text{DL}} \Delta_3.$

Nonmonotonicity of \leq_{DL}

- Given two default theories Δ_1 and Δ_2 ,
 $\Delta_1 \leq_{DL} \Delta_2$ implies neither
 $\Delta_1 \leq_{DL} \Delta_2 \cup \{F\}$ nor
 $\Delta_1 \cup \{F\} \leq_{DL} \Delta_2 \cup \{F\}$
for any formula F .
- In particular, $\Delta_1 \not\leq_{DL} \Delta_1 \cup \{F\}$
in general.
- Introduction of formulas does not
monotonically increase information.

Connection between \leq_{DL} and Default Extensions

Let $\Delta_1 = (D_1, W_1)$ and $\Delta_2 = (D_2, W_2)$ be two default theories. Then, $\Delta_1 \leq_{DL} \Delta_2$ if the following conditions are satisfied:

1. $W_2 \models W_1$,
2. $\forall E_2 \in \text{Ext}(\Delta_2), \exists E_1 \in \text{Ext}(\Delta_1)$
s.t. $E_1 \subseteq E_2$,
3. $\forall E_1 \in \text{Ext}(\Delta_1), \exists E_2 \in \text{Ext}(\Delta_2)$
s.t. $E_1 \subseteq E_2$.

Ordering Nonmonotonic Logic Programs

- An **extended logic program (ELP)** Π is a set of rules of the form:

$$L_0 \leftarrow L_1, \dots, L_m, \textit{not} L_{m+1}, \dots, \textit{not} L_n$$

where L_i is a literal and *not* represents ***negation as failure***.

- The semantics of an ELP is given by the **answer set semantics** .

Connection between DL and ELP [Gelfond & Lifschitz, 1991]

- The rule $L_0 \leftarrow L_1, \dots, L_m, \text{not } L_{m+1}, \dots, \text{not } L_n$ is interpreted as the default rule

$$\frac{L_1 \wedge \dots \wedge L_m : \neg L_{m+1}, \dots, \neg L_n}{L_0}$$

- There is a 1-1 correspondence between an answer set of a program and a default extension of its corresponding default theory.

Ordering ELPs

- The mapping ϕ_{π} and 9-valued interpretations of ELPs are introduced in a manner similar to DL.
- The ordering \leq_{AS} is introduced over ELPs.
- A sufficient condition to judge the order relation between two ELPs is given using the answer sets of those programs.

9-valued Interpretation of ELPs

Let Π be an ELP, $AS(\Pi)$ the set of all answer sets of Π , Π^+ the set of not-free rules from Π , and $Cn(\Pi^+)$ the set of smallest set of ground literals (logically) closed under Π^+ . For a positive literal L , define the mapping ϕ_{Π} as

$$\phi_{\Pi}(L) = \begin{cases} \text{t} & \text{if } AS(\Pi) \neq \emptyset \text{ and } L \in Cn(\Pi^+) ; \\ \text{f} & \text{if } AS(\Pi) \neq \emptyset \text{ and } \neg L \in Cn(\Pi^+) ; \end{cases}$$

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$$\phi_{\Pi}(L) = \begin{cases} \text{dts} & \text{if } AS(\Pi) \neq \phi, L \notin Cn(\Pi^+) \\ & \text{and } \forall S \in AS(\Pi), L \in S; \\ \text{dfs} & \text{if } AS(\Pi) \neq \phi, \neg L \notin Cn(\Pi^+) \\ & \text{and } \forall S \in AS(\Pi), \neg L \in S; \\ \text{dte} & \text{if } \exists S \in AS(\Pi) \text{ s.t. } L \in S \\ & \text{and } \exists T \in AS(\Pi) \text{ s.t. } L \notin T; \\ \text{dfe} & \text{if } \exists S \in AS(\Pi) \text{ s.t. } \neg L \in S \\ & \text{and } \exists T \in AS(\Pi) \text{ s.t. } \neg L \notin T; \\ \perp & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

We write $\phi_{\Pi}(L) = T$ if $\phi_{\Pi}(L) = t$ and $\phi_{\Pi}(L) = f$;
 and $\phi_{\Pi}(L) = *$ if $\phi_{\Pi}(L) = dte$ and $\phi_{\Pi}(L) = dfe$.

Order Relation between ELPs

- Given two ELPs Π_1 and Π_2 , Π_1 is stronger than Π_2 under the answer set semantics (written $\Pi_2 \leq_{AS} \Pi_1$) if $\phi_{\Pi_2}(L) \leq_K \phi_{\Pi_1}(L)$ for any literal L in the language.
- We write $\Pi_1 =_{AS} \Pi_2$ if $\Pi_1 \leq_{AS} \Pi_2$ and $\Pi_2 \leq_{AS} \Pi_1$.

Some Properties


- For two not-free ELPs Π_1 and Π_2 ,
 $\Pi_1 \leq_{AS} \Pi_2$ iff $Cn(\Pi_1) \subseteq Cn(\Pi_2)$.
- Given two ELPs Π_1 and Π_2 ,
 $\Pi_1 =_{AS} \Pi_2$ implies $AS(\Pi_1) = AS(\Pi_2)$,
but not vice-versa.
- \leq_{AS} is nonmonotonic wrt the
introduction of new rules to a
program.

Connection between \leq_{AS} and Answer Sets

Let Π_1 and Π_2 be two ELPs. Then, $\Pi_1 \leq_{AS} \Pi_2$ if the following conditions are satisfied:

1. $Cn(\Pi_1^+) \subseteq Cn(\Pi_2^+)$,
2. $\forall S \in AS(\Pi_2), \exists T \in AS(\Pi_1)$
s.t. $T \subseteq S$,
3. $\forall T \in AS(\Pi_1), \exists S \in AS(\Pi_2)$
s.t. $T \subseteq S$.

Comparison with Ginsberg's 7-valued bilattice for default logic



Comparison with Ginsberg's Logic

$$\Delta : \quad \frac{\vdash p \wedge q}{p \wedge q} \quad , \quad \frac{\vdash \neg p}{\neg p}$$

$$E_1 = Th(\{ p \wedge q \}) \quad , \quad E_2 = Th(\{ \neg p \})$$

$$\phi_{\Delta}(p) = * \quad , \quad \phi_{\Delta}(q) = dtc \quad , \quad \phi_{\Delta}(\neg p \vee q) = dts.$$

! Ginsberg interprets p as $*$, but handles both q and $\neg p \vee q$ as dt .

Computational Aspect

- There is a difficulty for computing $\phi_{\Delta}(F)$ for an arbitrary formula F .
- An order relation $\Delta_1 \leq_{DL} \Delta_2$ is judged using default extensions.
- In logic programming, the relation $\Pi_1 \leq_{AS} \Pi_2$ is checked using proof procedures for **answer set programming**.

Application to Inductive Logic Programming

The relation $\Pi_2 \leq_{AS} \Pi_1$ holds for

$$\Pi_1 = \{ \textit{flies}(x) \leftarrow \textit{bird}(x), \\ \textit{bird}(\textit{tweety}) \leftarrow \},$$

$$\Pi_2 = \{ \textit{flies}(x) \leftarrow \textit{bird}(x), \textit{not ab}(x), \\ \textit{bird}(\textit{tweety}) \leftarrow \}.$$

If we read the relation \leq_{AS} as “**more general**”, the ordering gives a theoretical ground for inductive generalization in **nonmonotonic ILP**.

Conclusion

- Multi-valued interpretation of default logic is introduced, that can distinguish definite and skeptical/credulous default conclusions.
- Based on this, an ordering for default theories is introduced and applied to nonmonotonic logic programming.
- The ordering has potential application to the theory of induction in NML.

Final Remarks

- The results provide a method of comparing default theories or logic programs in a manner different from the conventional extension-based or model-based standpoint.
- The 9-valued bilattice could be used for characterizing other NMR formalisms having the same inference modes as DL.