

*An abductive framework for computing knowledge base updates**

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Abstract

This paper introduces an abductive framework for updating knowledge bases represented by extended disjunctive programs. We first provide a simple transformation from abductive programs to *update programs* which are logic programs specifying changes on abductive hypotheses. Then, *extended abduction*, which was introduced by the same authors as a generalization of traditional abduction, is computed by the answer sets of update programs. Next, different types of updates, *view updates* and *theory updates* are characterized by abductive programs and computed by update programs. The task of *consistency restoration* is also realized as special cases of these updates. Each update problem is comparatively assessed from the computational complexity viewpoint. The result of this paper provides a uniform framework for different types of knowledge base updates, and each update is computed using existing procedures of logic programming.

KEYWORDS: extended disjunctive program, extended abduction, view update, theory update, consistency restoration

1 Introduction

1.1 Knowledge base updates

When new information arrives at a knowledge base, an intelligent agent adjusts its current knowledge or belief to conform to the new circumstances. The problem of knowledge base updates is then how to specify the desired change in a knowledge base and to compute it automatically. The issue has been extensively studied in the context of databases and Artificial Intelligence (AI) and several different types of updates are studied in the literature. Among others, the following three cases are typical problem settings in database and knowledge base updating. The first

* This paper is a revised and extended version of (Sakama and Inoue, 1999).

case considers a knowledge base which contains two different kinds of knowledge, variable knowledge and invariable knowledge. In this case, updates are permitted only on the variable knowledge. Updates on the invariable part are then translated into updates on the variable part. An example of this type of updates is a *view update* in *deductive databases* (Decker, 1990; Kakas and Mancarella, 1990a; Guessoum and Lloyd, 1990; Teniente and Olive, 1995). A deductive database consists of invariable derivation rules (called an *intensional database*) and variable base facts (called an *extensional database*). Then, the view update problem in deductive databases is concerned with the problem of translating an update request on the derived facts into updates on the base facts. (For updating deductive databases, an excellent survey is in Decker (1998).)

In the second case, on the other hand, there is no distinction between variable and invariable knowledge, and the whole knowledge base is subject to change. In this case, an update is done by directly introducing new information to a knowledge base. When there are conflicts between the current knowledge and the new knowledge, a higher priority is put on the new one to produce a consistent theory as a whole. This type of updates frequently appears in AI in the context of *theory updates* or *belief updates* (Fagin *et al.*, 1983; Winslett, 1990; Katsuno and Mendelzon, 1991). On the other hand, a knowledge base happens to be inconsistent in the face of contradictory knowledge. The third case handles *consistency restoration* in such knowledge bases. There are different sources which may cause inconsistency, e.g. conflicting information, violation of integrity constraints, etc. In this case, a knowledge base must be updated to restore consistency by detecting the source of inconsistency and repairing it. The problems of *integrity maintenance* in databases (Teniente and Olive, 1995; Decker, 1996), and *inconsistency removal* in knowledge bases (Pereira *et al.*, 1991; Inoue, 1994), are of this kind.

These three types of updates are not necessarily independent and orthogonal. In fact, integrity maintenance is often done as a subtask of a view update to remove contradiction derived by integrity constraints, and inconsistency removal is characterized as a special case of theory update which changes an inconsistent program to a consistent one. On the other hand, view updates and theory updates have been relatively independently studied so far and little connection exists between them. When a knowledge base is represented by a logic program, view updates are the problem of updating derived facts from a program, while theory updates are the problem of updating rules/facts included in a program. Thus, view updates and theory updates have seemingly different problem settings and goals. In fact, there are many studies which deal with updates in logic programming and deductive databases, while many of them are individual techniques to realize either view updates or theory updates. As far as the authors know, no study formalizes these two update problems in a single uniform framework.

1.2 Extended abduction

Abduction is a form of hypothetical reasoning in AI. A traditional logical framework of abduction (Poole, 1988; Kakas *et al.*, 1998) defines an *explanation* of a given

observation as a set of hypotheses which, together with the background theory, logically entails the observation. More precisely, given a first-order theory K and an observation G , traditional abduction computes a set E of hypotheses satisfying

$$K \cup E \models G$$

where $K \cup E$ is consistent.

When a background knowledge base K is *nonmonotonic*, however, the above framework of abduction is not sufficiently expressive. For example, consider the knowledge base written in a normal logic program:

$$\begin{aligned}
 K : \quad & \text{flies}(x) \leftarrow \text{bird}(x), \text{not } ab(x), \\
 & ab(x) \leftarrow \text{broken-wing}(x), \\
 & \text{bird}(\text{tweety}) \leftarrow , \\
 & \text{bird}(\text{opus}) \leftarrow , \\
 & \text{broken-wing}(\text{tweety}) \leftarrow ,
 \end{aligned}$$

where *not* represents *negation as failure*. If we observe that *tweety* flies, there is a good reason to assume that the wound has already healed. Then, removing the fact *broken-wing(tweety)* from the program explains the observation *flies(tweety)*. On the other hand, suppose that we later notice that *opus* does not fly any more. Since *flies(opus)* is entailed by K , we now have to revise the knowledge base to block the derivation of *flies(opus)* by assuming, for instance, *broken-wing(opus)*.

Traditional abduction has difficulty to cope with these situations. First, abduction computes facts which are to be introduced to a program to explain an observation. However, abduction cannot compute facts which are to be removed from a program to explain an observation. Secondly, abduction computes explanations accounting for an observation, while it cannot compute hypotheses to *unexplain* a phenomenon that does not hold anymore. To cope with the first problem, Inoue & Sakama (1995) introduce the notion of “negative explanations”. Given a background knowledge base K and an observation G , a set F of hypotheses is called a *negative explanation* of G if

$$K \setminus F \models G$$

where $K \setminus F$ is consistent. An explanation E satisfying $K \cup E \models G$ is then called a *positive explanation*. On the other hand, the notion of “anti-explanations” is introduced to characterize the second situation. Given a background knowledge base K and an observation G , a set E of hypotheses is called a (*positive*) *anti-explanation* of G if

$$K \cup E \not\models G,$$

and a set F of hypotheses is called a *negative anti-explanation* of G if

$$K \setminus F \not\models G.$$

These extensions of traditional abduction are called *extended abduction* (Inoue and Sakama, 1995). Extended abduction is particularly useful when a knowledge base is *nonmonotonic*. In nonmonotonic theories, deletion of formulas may introduce

new formulas. Thus, positive and negative explanations play a complementary role in accounting for an observation in nonmonotonic theories. On the other hand, anti-explanations are useful to account for *negative observations* which do not hold. In this respect, traditional abduction is concerned with explaining *positive observations* only. Negative observations are often perceived in real-life situations, and are analogous to the concept of *negative examples* in *inductive concept-learning*. Thus, anti-explanations play a dual role to explanations. Moreover, extended abduction not only enhances reasoning ability of traditional abduction, but has useful applications for nonmonotonic theory change (Inoue and Sakama, 1995), system repair problems (Buccafurri *et al.*, 1997), and incremental evolution of (inconsistent) requirement specifications (Nuseibeh and Russo, 1999).

1.3 The purpose of this paper

The purposes of this paper are twofold. Our first goal is to provide a method of computing extended abduction. Many procedures exist for (traditional) abduction, while few is known for extended abduction with the exception of Inoue & Sakama (1999). Inoue & Sakama (1999) provide a computational method for extended abduction in a restricted class of normal logic program. By contrast, this paper considers extended abduction in Extended Disjunctive Programs (EDPs) which are a fairly general class of logic programming. To compute extended abduction, this paper introduces an *update program* which is a logic program obtained by a simple program transformation. An update program specifies changes on abductive hypotheses, and (minimal) (anti-)explanations are computed by the (*U-minimal*) *answer sets* of an update program.

Our second goal is to characterize various types of knowledge base updates through extended abduction. It is well known that knowledge base updates are related to abduction problems, and there are several studies which realize updates through abduction. However, due to the nature of traditional abduction, existing studies often adopt somewhat indirect formulations for representing hypotheses removal or view deletion (see section 7.2 for detailed discussion). In this paper we use extended abduction and formalize different types of update problems such as view updates, theory updates, and consistency restoration. These updates are then computed using update programs. We assess computational complexities and compare the difficulty of each update problem.

This paper is a revised and extended version of Sakama & Inoue (1999). In the previous paper we considered knowledge base updates in *extended logic programs*. In the present paper, we extend the techniques to Extended Disjunctive Programs (EDPs) which possibly contain disjunction in a program. EDPs are strictly more expressive than extended (or normal) logic programs without disjunction, and are useful to express many practical problems in the complexity class Σ_2^P (Eiter *et al.*, 1997). In the context of updating data/knowledge bases, there are few studies which handle updating disjunctive (deductive) databases. The present paper is thus intended to provide a framework for (extended) abduction and update, which is applicable to a broader class of logic programming and deductive databases.

The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces a theoretical framework used in this paper. Section 3 introduces the notion of update programs and a method of computing extended abduction. Sections 4 and 5 respectively characterize view updates and theory updates through extended abduction, and provide their computational methods by update programs. Consistency restoration is also characterized as a special case of each update. Section 6 analyzes computational complexities of various update problems. Section 7 presents detailed comparisons with related work, and section 8 concludes the paper.

2 Preliminaries

2.1 Extended disjunctive programs

In this paper we consider knowledge bases represented as Extended Disjunctive Programs (EDPs).

An EDP is a set of *rules* of the form:

$$L_1; \cdots; L_l \leftarrow L_{l+1}, \dots, L_m, \text{ not } L_{m+1}, \dots, \text{ not } L_n \quad (n \geq m \geq l \geq 0) \quad (\dagger)$$

where each L_i is a literal, ‘;’ represents ‘or’, and *not* represents *negation as failure* (NAF). *not* L is also called an *NAF-literal*. The part left of \leftarrow is the *head* and the part right of \leftarrow is the *body* of the rule. We often use the Greek letter Σ (resp. Γ) to represent the disjunction (resp. conjunction) in the head (resp. body). Σ or Γ is identified with the set of (NAF-)literals included in it. A rule is *disjunctive* if its head contains more than one literal. The head is possibly empty and a rule with the empty head is called an *integrity constraint*. A disjunctive rule with the empty body is called a *disjunctive fact*. A disjunctive fact $L_1; \cdots; L_l \leftarrow$ is simply written as $L_1; \cdots; L_l$. In particular, the non-disjunctive fact $L \leftarrow$ is identified with the literal L and is simply called a *fact*. An EDP is called an *extended logic program* (ELP) if $l \leq 1$ for each rule (\dagger); and a *normal disjunctive program* (NDP) if every L_i is an atom. An NDP is called a *normal logic program* (NLP) if $l \leq 1$ for each rule (\dagger). In this paper, a *program* means an EDP unless stated otherwise. A program (rule, (NAF-)literal) is *ground* if it contains no variable. A program P is semantically identified with its ground instantiation, i.e. the set of all ground rules obtained from P by substituting variables in P by elements of its Herbrand universe in every possible way. Thus, a program containing variables is considered as a shorthand of its ground instantiation.

The semantics of EDPs is given by the *answer set semantics* (Gelfond and Lifschitz, 1991). Let \mathcal{L}_P be the set of all ground literals in the language of a program P . A set $S (\subseteq \mathcal{L}_P)$ satisfies the ground rule of the form (\dagger) if $\{L_{l+1}, \dots, L_m\} \subseteq S$ and $\{L_{m+1}, \dots, L_n\} \cap S = \emptyset$ imply $L_i \in S$ for some i ($1 \leq i \leq l$). In particular, S satisfies the ground integrity constraint $\leftarrow L_1, \dots, L_m, \text{ not } L_{m+1}, \dots, \text{ not } L_n$ if $\{L_1, \dots, L_m\} \not\subseteq S$ or $\{L_{m+1}, \dots, L_n\} \cap S \neq \emptyset$. Let P be a *not-free* EDP (i.e., $m = n$ for each rule of (\dagger)). Then, a set $S (\subseteq \mathcal{L}_P)$ is an *answer set* of P if S is a minimal set such that

1. S satisfies every ground rule from the ground instantiation of P ,
2. If S contains a pair of complementary literals L and $\neg L$, then $S = \mathcal{L}_P$.

Next, let P be any EDP and $S \subseteq \mathcal{L}_P$. Then, the *not-free* EDP P^S is defined as follows: for every ground rule (\dagger) from the ground instantiation of P , the rule $L_1; \dots; L_l \leftarrow L_{l+1}, \dots, L_m$ is in P^S if $\{L_{m+1}, \dots, L_n\} \cap S = \emptyset$. Then, S is an *answer set* of P if S is an answer set of P^S . An EDP has none, one, or multiple answer sets in general. Answer sets coincide with *stable models* (Gelfond and Lifschitz, 1988) when P is an NDP or an NLP.

An answer set is *consistent* if it is not \mathcal{L}_P . A program P is *consistent* if it has a consistent answer set; otherwise P is *inconsistent*. If a rule R is satisfied in every answer set of P , it is written as $P \models R$. In particular, $P \models L$ if a literal L is included in every answer set of P . When P is inconsistent, we write $P \models \perp$ where \perp is the reserved proposition in \mathcal{L}_P .

2.2 Abductive programs

The abductive framework considered in this paper is based on *extended abduction* introduced by Inoue & Sakama (1995).

An *abductive program* is a pair $\langle P, \mathcal{A} \rangle$ where P and \mathcal{A} are EDPs. Every element in \mathcal{A} is called an *abducible*. An abducible $A \in \mathcal{A}$ is also called an *abducible rule* (resp. *abducible fact*) if A is a rule (resp. a fact). An abducible containing variables is considered as a shorthand of its ground instantiation. So any instance A of an element from \mathcal{A} is also an abducible and is written as $A \in \mathcal{A}$. Abducibles are hypothetical rules which are used to account for an observation together with the background knowledge P . Similar frameworks are also introduced in (Inoue, 1994; Inoue and Sakama, 1998). An abductive program $\langle P, \mathcal{A} \rangle$ is *consistent* if P is consistent. Without loss of generality, we assume that for any rule $\Sigma \leftarrow \Gamma$ from P , $\Sigma \cap \mathcal{A} \neq \emptyset$ implies both $\Sigma \subseteq \mathcal{A}$ and $\Gamma = \emptyset$.¹ If there is a rule $\Sigma \leftarrow \Gamma$ with $\Sigma \cap \mathcal{A} \neq \emptyset$ such that $\Sigma \not\subseteq \mathcal{A}$ or $\Gamma \neq \emptyset$, then any $A \in \Sigma \cap \mathcal{A}$ is made a non-abducible by introducing a rule $A \leftarrow A'$ with a new abducible A' and replacing A with A' in every (disjunctive) fact consisting abducibles only.

We also assume that for any disjunctive fact $\Sigma \leftarrow$ from P , $\Sigma \subseteq \mathcal{A}$ implies $\Sigma \in \mathcal{A}$. That is, if a program contains a disjunctive fact Σ which consists of abducibles, Σ itself is included in \mathcal{A} as an abducible. This condition is natural, since any disjunctive fact in P which consists of abducibles is considered a hypothesis. On the other hand, any disjunctive fact which is not included in P is freely specified in \mathcal{A} as a possible hypothesis.

Let $\langle P, \mathcal{A} \rangle$ be an abductive program and G a ground literal representing a *positive observation*. A pair (E, F) is a *skeptical explanation* of G with respect to $\langle P, \mathcal{A} \rangle$ if

1. $(P \setminus F) \cup E \models G$,
2. $(P \setminus F) \cup E$ is consistent,
3. $E \subseteq \mathcal{A} \setminus P$ and $F \subseteq \mathcal{A} \cap P$.

If the first condition is replaced by ‘ G is true in *some* answer set of $(P \setminus F) \cup E$ ’, (E, F) is called a *credulous explanation*. Any skeptical explanation is a credulous

¹ We pose this assumption just by technical reasons. A similar assumption is assumed, for instance, in (Kakas *et al.*, 1998).

explanation. On the other hand, given a ground literal G representing a *negative observation*, a pair (E, F) is a *credulous anti-explanation* of G with respect to $\langle P, \mathcal{A} \rangle$ if

1. $(P \setminus F) \cup E \not\models G$,
2. $(P \setminus F) \cup E$ is consistent,
3. $E \subseteq \mathcal{A} \setminus P$ and $F \subseteq \mathcal{A} \cap P$.

If the first condition is replaced by ‘ G is true in no answer set of $(P \setminus F) \cup E$ ’, (E, F) is called a *skeptical anti-explanation*. Any skeptical anti-explanation is a credulous anti-explanation. In particular, when $G = \perp$, the first and the second conditions are identical. In this case, the credulous anti-explanation (E, F) of \perp is a hypothesis which turns a (possibly inconsistent) P to a consistent program $(P \setminus F) \cup E$.

Throughout the paper, a skeptical/credulous (anti-)explanation is simply called an (anti-)explanation when such a distinction is not important. A positive or negative observation is also simply called an observation when no confusion arises. Without loss of generality, an observation is assumed to be a (non-abducible) ground literal (Inoue and Sakama, 1996). By the third condition, the introduced hypotheses E are abducibles which are not included in the program P , while the removed hypotheses F are abducibles which are included in P . Thus, it holds that $E \cap F = \emptyset$ for any (anti-)explanation (E, F) . Among (anti-)explanations, *minimal (anti-)explanations* are of particular interest. An (anti-)explanation (E, F) of an observation G is called *minimal* if for any (anti-)explanation (E', F') of G , $E' \subseteq E$ and $F' \subseteq F$ imply $E' = E$ and $F' = F$.

Note that the abduction problem considered here is different from the usual one based on traditional normal abduction (Kakas *et al.*, 1998).² That is, given an abductive program $\langle P, \mathcal{A} \rangle$, *normal abduction* computes a *skeptical explanation* (resp. *credulous explanation*) E of a positive observation G satisfying

1. $P \cup E \models G$ (resp. G is true in some answer set of $P \cup E$),
2. $P \cup E$ is consistent,
3. $E \subseteq \mathcal{A} \setminus P$.

Compared with normal abduction, extended abduction abduces hypotheses which are not only introduced to a program but also removed from a program to explain observations. Moreover, anti-explanations are used to *unexplain* a negative observation which is not true. With this respect, normal abduction is considered as a special case of extended abduction where only hypotheses introduction is considered for explaining positive observations.

In an abductive program $\langle P, \mathcal{A} \rangle$, P and \mathcal{A} are semantically identified with their ground instantiations, so that set operations over them are defined on the ground instances. Thus, when (E, F) contains variables, $(P \setminus F) \cup E$ means that deleting every instance of F from P and adding any instance of E to P . Also, when E contains variables, the set inclusion $E' \subseteq E$ is defined for any instance E' of E . Generally, given

² To distinguish extended abduction from traditional one, we call traditional abduction *normal abduction*, hereafter.

sets S and T of literals/rules containing variables, any set operation \circ is defined as $S \circ T = \text{inst}(S) \circ \text{inst}(T)$ where $\text{inst}(S)$ is the ground instantiation of S (Inoue, 2000). For example, when $p(x) \in T$, for any constant 'a' in the language of T , it holds that $\{p(a)\} \subseteq T$, $\{p(a)\} \setminus T = \emptyset$, and $T \setminus \{p(a)\} = (T \setminus \{p(x)\}) \cup \{p(y) \mid y \neq a\}$, and so on. Also, any literal/rule in a set is identified with its variant modulo variable renaming.

Example 2.1

Let $\langle P, \mathcal{A} \rangle$ be the abductive program such that

$$\begin{aligned} P : \quad & g \leftarrow p(x), \text{ not } r \\ & r \leftarrow q(a), \\ & q(a) \leftarrow, \quad q(b) \leftarrow . \\ \mathcal{A} : \quad & p(x), q(x). \end{aligned}$$

Then, $(\{p(x)\}, \{q(x)\})$ is a skeptical explanation of g , while $(\{p(a)\}, \{q(a)\})$ and $(\{p(b)\}, \{q(a)\})$ are the minimal skeptical explanations of g .

Suppose an abductive program $\langle P, \mathcal{A} \rangle$ where \mathcal{A} contains rules or disjunctive facts. In this case, $\langle P, \mathcal{A} \rangle$ is transformed to a semantically equivalent abductive program in which abducibles contain only (non-disjunctive) facts as follows. Given an abductive program $\langle P, \mathcal{A} \rangle$, let

$$\mathcal{R} = \{ \Sigma \leftarrow \Gamma \mid (\Sigma \leftarrow \Gamma) \in \mathcal{A} \text{ and } \Sigma \leftarrow \Gamma \text{ is not a non-disjunctive fact} \}.$$

Then, we define

$$\begin{aligned} P^n &= (P \setminus \mathcal{R}) \cup \{ \Sigma \leftarrow \Gamma, \gamma_R \mid R = (\Sigma \leftarrow \Gamma) \in \mathcal{R} \} \\ &\quad \cup \{ \gamma_R \leftarrow \mid R \in \mathcal{R} \cap P \}, \\ \mathcal{A}^n &= (\mathcal{A} \setminus \mathcal{R}) \cup \{ \gamma_R \mid R \in \mathcal{R} \}, \end{aligned}$$

where γ_R is a newly introduced atom (called the *name* of R) uniquely associated with each rule R in \mathcal{R} . For any rule $R \in \mathcal{R}$, we refer to its name using the function $n(R) = \gamma_R$. In particular, we define that any abducible fact $L \leftarrow$ has the name L , i.e. $n(L) = L$. We call $\langle P^n, \mathcal{A}^n \rangle$ the *normal form* of $\langle P, \mathcal{A} \rangle$. With this setting, for any observation G there is a 1-1 correspondence between (anti-)explanations with respect to $\langle P, \mathcal{A} \rangle$ and those with respect to $\langle P^n, \mathcal{A}^n \rangle$. In what follows, $n(E) = \{ n(R) \mid R \in E \}$.

Proposition 2.1 (normal form transformation)

Let $\langle P, \mathcal{A} \rangle$ be an abductive program and $\langle P^n, \mathcal{A}^n \rangle$ its normal form. Then, an observation G has a (minimal) credulous/skeptical (anti-)explanation (E, F) with respect to $\langle P, \mathcal{A} \rangle$ iff G has a (minimal) credulous/skeptical (anti-)explanation $(n(E), n(F))$ with respect to $\langle P^n, \mathcal{A}^n \rangle$.

Proof

By the definition of $\langle P^n, \mathcal{A}^n \rangle$, G is included in a consistent answer set of $(P \setminus F) \cup E$ iff G is included in a consistent answer set of $(P^n \setminus n(F)) \cup n(E)$ with $n(E) \subseteq \mathcal{A}^n \setminus P^n$ and $n(F) \subseteq \mathcal{A}^n \cap P^n$. Hence, the result holds. \square

Example 2.2

Let $\langle P, \mathcal{A} \rangle$ be the abductive program such that

$$\begin{aligned}
 P : \quad & \text{flies}(x) \leftarrow \text{bird}(x), \\
 & \text{bird}(x) \leftarrow \text{penguin}(x), \\
 & \text{bird}(\text{polly}) \leftarrow, \\
 & \text{penguin}(\text{tweety}) \leftarrow. \\
 \mathcal{A} : \quad & \text{flies}(x) \leftarrow \text{bird}(x), \\
 & \neg\text{flies}(x) \leftarrow \text{penguin}(x).
 \end{aligned}$$

Then, the positive observation $G = \neg\text{flies}(\text{tweety})$ has the minimal skeptical explanation $(E, F) = (\{\neg\text{flies}(\text{tweety}) \leftarrow \text{penguin}(\text{tweety})\}, \{\text{flies}(\text{tweety}) \leftarrow \text{bird}(\text{tweety})\})$.

On the other hand, the abductive program $\langle P, \mathcal{A} \rangle$ is transformed to the normal form $\langle P^n, \mathcal{A}^n \rangle$ where

$$\begin{aligned}
 P^n : \quad & \text{flies}(x) \leftarrow \text{bird}(x), \gamma_1(x), \\
 & \text{bird}(x) \leftarrow \text{penguin}(x), \\
 & \neg\text{flies}(x) \leftarrow \text{penguin}(x), \gamma_2(x), \\
 & \gamma_1(x) \leftarrow, \text{bird}(\text{polly}) \leftarrow, \\
 & \text{penguin}(\text{tweety}) \leftarrow, \\
 \mathcal{A}^n : \quad & \gamma_1(x), \gamma_2(x).
 \end{aligned}$$

Here, $\gamma_1(x)$ and $\gamma_2(x)$ are the names of the rules $\text{flies}(x) \leftarrow \text{bird}(x)$ and $\neg\text{flies}(x) \leftarrow \text{penguin}(x)$, respectively. In this program, $G = \neg\text{flies}(\text{tweety})$ has the minimal skeptical explanation $(\{\gamma_2(\text{tweety})\}, \{\gamma_1(\text{tweety})\})$, which corresponds to the minimal explanation (E, F) presented above.

Note that $(E', F') = (\{\neg\text{flies}(x) \leftarrow \text{penguin}(x)\}, \{\text{flies}(x) \leftarrow \text{bird}(x)\})$ is also an explanation of G with respect to $\langle P, \mathcal{A} \rangle$, but it is not minimal (cf. Example 2.1). In fact, $E \subseteq E'$ and $F \subseteq F'$.

By the definition of abductive programs, a program includes no disjunctive rule which contains both abducibles and non-abducibles in its head. Thus, if there is a disjunctive fact $\Sigma \leftarrow$ in P , every disjunct in Σ is an abducible. This justifies the replacement of the disjunction Σ with a new abducible γ in the normal form.

Example 2.3

Let $\langle P, \mathcal{A} \rangle$ be the abductive program such that

$$\begin{aligned}
 P : \quad & p \leftarrow a, \\
 & p \leftarrow b, \\
 & a ; b \leftarrow. \\
 \mathcal{A} : \quad & a, b, (a ; b).
 \end{aligned}$$

Transform $\langle P, \mathcal{A} \rangle$ to $\langle P^n, \mathcal{A}^n \rangle$ with

$$\begin{aligned}
 P^n : \quad & p \leftarrow a, \\
 & p \leftarrow b,
 \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
 & a; b \leftarrow \gamma, \\
 & \gamma \leftarrow . \\
 \mathcal{A}^n : & \quad a, b, \gamma.
 \end{aligned}$$

Then, the negative observation p has the skeptical anti-explanation $(\emptyset, \{\gamma\})$ with respect to $\langle P^n, \mathcal{A}^n \rangle$, which corresponds to the anti-explanation $(\emptyset, \{a; b\})$ with respect to $\langle P, \mathcal{A} \rangle$.

Using the transformation, any abductive program having abducible rules is reduced to an abductive program having only (non-disjunctive) abducible facts. Thus, in the next section we consider an abductive program $\langle P, \mathcal{A} \rangle$ where \mathcal{A} contains only (non-disjunctive) facts, unless specified otherwise.³

3 Extended abduction through update programs

In this section we introduce the notion of update programs and characterize extended abduction through them.

3.1 Update programs

Suppose an abductive program $\langle P, \mathcal{A} \rangle$ where \mathcal{A} consists of abducible facts. Then, update rules/programs are defined as follows.

Definition 3.1 (update rules)

Given an abductive program $\langle P, \mathcal{A} \rangle$, the set UR of *update rules* is defined as follows.

1. For any literal $a \in \mathcal{A}$, the following rules are in UR :

$$\begin{aligned}
 & a \leftarrow \text{not } \bar{a}, \\
 & \bar{a} \leftarrow \text{not } a,
 \end{aligned}$$

where \bar{a} is a newly introduced atom uniquely associated with a . For notational convenience, the above pair of rules is expressed as $abd(a)$, hereafter.

2. For any literal $a \in \mathcal{A} \setminus P$, the following rule is in UR :

$$+a \leftarrow a.$$

3. For any literal $a \in \mathcal{A} \cap P$, the following rule is in UR :

$$-a \leftarrow \text{not } a.$$

Here, $+a$ and $-a$ are atoms which are uniquely associated with any $a \in \mathcal{A}$. These are called *update atoms*.

³ By contrast, Inoue & Sakama (2002) introduce a method of directly computing (anti-)explanations which are disjunctions of abducibles.

By the definition, the atom \bar{a} becomes true iff a is not true. The pair of rules in $abd(a)$ then specify the situation that an abducible a is true or not. Similar transformations are introduced in Satoh & Iwayama (1991) and Inoue (1994) in the context of transforming abductive programs to normal logic programs. The pair of rules in $abd(a)$ is also represented by the semantically equivalent disjunctive fact

$$a; \bar{a} \leftarrow .$$

This replacement is useful to avoid introducing unstratified negation in $abd(a)$ when the original program P is stratified.

In the second condition, when $p(x) \in \mathcal{A}$, $p(a) \in P$ and $p(t) \notin P$ for $t \neq a$, the rule precisely becomes $+p(t) \leftarrow p(t)$ for any $t \neq a$. In such a case, the rule is shortly written as $+p(x) \leftarrow p(x)$, $x \neq a$. Generally, the rule becomes $+p(x) \leftarrow p(x)$, $x \neq t_1, \dots, x \neq t_n$ for n such instances. The rule $+a \leftarrow a$ derives the atom $+a$ if an abducible a which is not in P is to be true. In contrast, the rule $-a \leftarrow not\ a$ derives the atom $-a$ if an abducible a which is in P is not to be true. Thus, update atoms represent the change of truth values of abducibles in a program, i.e. $+a$ means the introduction of a , while $-a$ means the deletion of a . When an abducible a contains variables, the associated update atom $+a$ or $-a$ is supposed to have exactly the same variables. In this case, an update atom is semantically identified with its ground instances. The set of all update atoms associated with the abducibles in \mathcal{A} is denoted by $\mathcal{U}\mathcal{A}$. We define that $\mathcal{U}\mathcal{A} = \mathcal{U}\mathcal{A}^+ \cup \mathcal{U}\mathcal{A}^-$, where $\mathcal{U}\mathcal{A}^+$ (resp. $\mathcal{U}\mathcal{A}^-$) is the set of update atoms of the form $+a$ (resp. $-a$).

Definition 3.2 (update programs)

Given an abductive program $\langle P, \mathcal{A} \rangle$, its *update program* UP is defined as an EDP such that

$$UP = (P \setminus \mathcal{A}) \cup UR.$$

UP becomes an ELP when P is an ELP.

Definition 3.3 (U-minimal answer sets)

An answer set S of UP is called *U-minimal* if there is no answer set T of UP such that $T \cap \mathcal{U}\mathcal{A} \subset S \cap \mathcal{U}\mathcal{A}$.

By the definition, U-minimal answer sets exist whenever UP has answer sets. A U-minimal answer set is used for characterizing a minimal change in P . In particular, when there is no observation, there is a 1-1 correspondence between the U-minimal answer sets of UP and the consistent answer sets of P .

Proposition 3.1 (U-minimal answer sets vs. answer sets)

Let $\langle P, \mathcal{A} \rangle$ be an abductive program and UP its update program. Then, P has a consistent answer set T iff UP has a U-minimal answer set S such that $S \cap \mathcal{U}\mathcal{A} = \emptyset$ and $S \cap \mathcal{L}_P = T$.

Proof

Let T be a consistent answer set of P . Put $S = T \cup \{ \bar{a} \mid a \in \mathcal{A} \setminus P \}$, then $S \cap \mathcal{L}_P = T$. By the definition of abductive programs, any abducible $a \in \mathcal{A} \setminus P$ does not appear in the head of any rule which is not a fact in P . So T contains

no abducible a such that $a \in \mathcal{A} \setminus P$, then $\bar{a} \in S$ implies $a \notin S$. Next, consider $UP^S = (P \setminus \mathcal{A})^S \cup UR^S$. It holds that $(P \setminus \mathcal{A})^S = (P \setminus \mathcal{A})^T = P^T \setminus \mathcal{A}$. For any $abd(a) \in UR$, $(a \leftarrow) \in UR^S$ iff $\bar{a} \notin S$ iff $a \in \mathcal{A} \cap P$; and $(\bar{a} \leftarrow) \in UR^S$ iff $a \notin S$ iff $a \in \mathcal{A} \setminus P$. Also, any $+a \leftarrow a$ in UR is also in UR^S . Since T is an answer set of P , by the construction of S it contains every abducible a such that $a \in \mathcal{A} \cap P$. Thus, any $-a \leftarrow not\ a$ in UR is not included in UR^S . Hence, $UP^S = (P \setminus \mathcal{A})^S \cup UR^S = (P^T \setminus \mathcal{A}) \cup \{a \leftarrow \mid a \in \mathcal{A} \cap P\} \cup \{\bar{a} \leftarrow \mid a \in \mathcal{A} \setminus P\} \cup \{+a \leftarrow a \mid a \in \mathcal{A} \setminus P\} = P^T \cup \{\bar{a} \leftarrow \mid \bar{a} \in S\} \cup \{+a \leftarrow a \mid a \in \mathcal{A} \setminus P\}$. As T is an answer set of P^T and $a \notin S$, S becomes an answer set of UP^S . Thus, S is an answer set of UP . Since $S \cap \mathcal{U}\mathcal{A} = \emptyset$, S is also U-minimal.

Conversely, let S be a U-minimal answer set of UP such that $S \cap \mathcal{U}\mathcal{A} = \emptyset$. By $S \cap \mathcal{U}\mathcal{A} = \emptyset$, S contains no literal in $\mathcal{A} \setminus P$. Hence, S is a consistent answer set. Also, it implies $a \in S \cap \mathcal{A}$ iff $a \in \mathcal{A} \cap P$ iff $a \in \mathcal{A} \cap UP^S$. Put $T = S \cap \mathcal{L}_P$. Then, $P^T = \{\Sigma \leftarrow \Gamma \mid (\Sigma \leftarrow \Gamma) \in UP^S \text{ and } \Sigma \subseteq \mathcal{L}_P\}$. Since S is a consistent answer set of UP^S , T becomes a consistent answer set of P^T . Hence, T is a consistent answer set of P . \square

Example 3.1

Let $\langle P, \mathcal{A} \rangle$ be the abductive program such that

$$\begin{aligned}
 P : \quad & p \leftarrow b, \\
 & q \leftarrow a, not\ b, \\
 & a \leftarrow . \\
 \mathcal{A} : \quad & a, b.
 \end{aligned}$$

Then, UP becomes

$$\begin{aligned}
 UP : \quad & p \leftarrow b, \\
 & q \leftarrow a, not\ b, \\
 & abd(a),\ abd(b), \\
 & -a \leftarrow not\ a, \\
 & +b \leftarrow b.
 \end{aligned}$$

Here, UP has four answer sets: $S_1 = \{a, b, +b, p\}$, $S_2 = \{\bar{a}, b, -a, +b, p\}$, $S_3 = \{a, \bar{b}, q\}$, and $S_4 = \{\bar{a}, \bar{b}, -a\}$. Of these, S_3 is the U-minimal answer set and $S_3 \cap \mathcal{L}_P$ coincides with the answer set of P .

3.2 Computing (anti-)explanations through UP

Next, we provide a method of computing (anti-)explanations through update programs. A positive observation G represents an evidence which is to be true in a program. The situation is specified by the integrity constraint

$$\leftarrow not\ G,$$

which represents that ‘ G should be true’. By contrast, a negative observation G represents an evidence which is not to be true in a program. The situation is

specified by the integrity constraint

$$\leftarrow G,$$

which represents that ‘ G must not be true’.

For instance, to explain the positive observation p in the program P of Example 3.1, consider the program $UP \cup \{\leftarrow \text{not } p\}$. It has two answer sets: S_1 and S_2 , of which S_1 is the U-minimal answer set. Observe that the positive observation p has the unique minimal (skeptical) explanation $(\{b\}, \emptyset)$ with respect to $\langle P, \mathcal{A} \rangle$. The situation is expressed by the update atom $+b$ in S_1 . On the other hand, to unexplain the negative observation q in P , consider the program $UP \cup \{\leftarrow q\}$. It has three answer sets: S_1 , S_2 , and S_4 , of which S_1 and S_4 are the U-minimal answer sets. Here, the negative observation q has two minimal (skeptical) anti-explanations $(\{b\}, \emptyset)$ and $(\emptyset, \{a\})$ with respect to $\langle P, \mathcal{A} \rangle$. The situations are respectively expressed by the update atom $+b$ in S_1 and $-a$ in S_4 . Note that when the positive observation p and the negative observation q are given at the same time, S_1 becomes the unique U-minimal answer set of $UP \cup \{\leftarrow \text{not } p\} \cup \{\leftarrow q\}$.⁴

These examples illustrate that the U-minimal answer sets are used to compute minimal (anti-)explanations of extended abduction. Note that the constraint $\leftarrow \text{not } G$ extracts answer sets in which G is true, but this does not imply that G is true in every answer set of $(P \setminus F) \cup E$. To know that (E, F) is a skeptical explanation of G , we need an additional test for checking the entailment of G from $(P \setminus F) \cup E$.

Proposition 3.2 (credulous vs. skeptical explanations)

Let $\langle P, \mathcal{A} \rangle$ be an abductive program and G a positive observation. Suppose that (E, F) is a credulous explanation of G with respect to $\langle P, \mathcal{A} \rangle$. Then, (E, F) is a skeptical explanation of G with respect to $\langle P, \mathcal{A} \rangle$ iff $(P \setminus F) \cup E \cup \{\leftarrow G\}$ is inconsistent.

Proof

When (E, F) is a credulous explanation of G with respect to $\langle P, \mathcal{A} \rangle$, $(P \setminus F) \cup E$ has a consistent answer set in which G is true. Then, (E, F) is a skeptical explanation of G with respect to $\langle P, \mathcal{A} \rangle$

iff $(P \setminus F) \cup E$ has no consistent answer set in which G is not true

iff $(P \setminus F) \cup E \cup \{\leftarrow G\}$ is inconsistent. \square

Example 3.2

Let $\langle P, \mathcal{A} \rangle$ be the abductive program such that

$$\begin{aligned} P : \quad & p ; q \leftarrow a, \\ & \neg q \leftarrow \text{not } b, \\ & b \leftarrow . \\ \mathcal{A} : \quad & a, b. \end{aligned}$$

⁴ When there are positive observations p_1, \dots, p_m and negative observations q_1, \dots, q_n , instead of considering the $(m + n)$ -goals $\leftarrow \text{not } p_i$ and $\leftarrow q_j$, the same effect is achieved by introducing the rule $g \leftarrow p_1, \dots, p_m, \text{not } q_1, \dots, \text{not } q_n$ to UP and considering the single goal $\leftarrow \text{not } g$.

Given the positive observation $G = p$, $(E, F) = (\{a\}, \{b\})$, $(\{a\}, \emptyset)$ are two credulous explanations. Among them, $(\{a\}, \{b\})$ is also the skeptical explanation of G where $(P \setminus \{b\}) \cup \{a\} \cup \{\leftarrow p\}$ is inconsistent.

In what follows, given sets $E \subseteq \mathcal{A}$ and $F \subseteq \mathcal{A}$, we define $E^+ = \{+a \mid a \in E\}$ and $F^- = \{-a \mid a \in F\}$. Conversely, given sets $E^+ \subseteq \mathcal{U}\mathcal{A}^+$ and $F^- \subseteq \mathcal{U}\mathcal{A}^-$, we define $E = \{a \mid +a \in E^+\}$ and $F = \{a \mid -a \in F^-\}$. Then, (minimal) credulous/skeptical explanations are computed by update programs as follows.

Theorem 3.3 (computing credulous explanations through UP)

Let $\langle P, \mathcal{A} \rangle$ be an abductive program, UP its update program, and G a positive observation.

1. The pair (E, F) is a credulous explanation of G iff $UP \cup \{\leftarrow \text{not } G\}$ has a consistent answer set S such that $E^+ = S \cap \mathcal{U}\mathcal{A}^+$ and $F^- = S \cap \mathcal{U}\mathcal{A}^-$.
2. The pair (E, F) is a minimal credulous explanation of G iff $UP \cup \{\leftarrow \text{not } G\}$ has a consistent U-minimal answer set S such that $E^+ = S \cap \mathcal{U}\mathcal{A}^+$ and $F^- = S \cap \mathcal{U}\mathcal{A}^-$.

Proof

1. Let S be a consistent answer set of $UP \cup \{\leftarrow \text{not } G\}$ such that $E^+ = S \cap \mathcal{U}\mathcal{A}^+$ and $F^- = S \cap \mathcal{U}\mathcal{A}^-$. For each $+a \in E^+$ and $-b \in F^-$, $a \in S$ and $b \notin S$ hold respectively. Then, $a \leftarrow$ and $\bar{b} \leftarrow$ are, respectively, produced by $abd(a)$ and $abd(b)$ in UP^S , so that $(a \leftarrow) \in UP^S$ and $(b \leftarrow) \notin UP^S$. By the definition, $+a \in E^+$ implies $a \in E$ and $-b \in F^-$ implies $b \in F$, so UP^S contains a rule $\Sigma \leftarrow \Gamma$ with $\Sigma \subseteq \mathcal{L}_P$ iff $((P \setminus F) \cup E)^S$ has the same rule. Put $T = S \cap \mathcal{L}_P$. As $G \in S$, T is a consistent answer set of $(P \setminus F) \cup E$ in which G is true. Since $E \subseteq \mathcal{A} \setminus P$ and $F \subseteq \mathcal{A} \cap P$, (E, F) is a credulous explanation of G . Conversely, suppose that (E, F) is a credulous explanation of G . Then, there is a consistent answer set T of $(P \setminus F) \cup E$ in which G is true. By the definition of abductive programs, abducibles are assumed to appear in the head of no (non-factual) rule in P . Thus, $a \in E$ and $b \in F$ imply $a \in T$ and $b \notin T$, respectively. In this case, UP^T contains facts $a \leftarrow$ and $\bar{b} \leftarrow$ which are respectively produced by $abd(a)$ and $abd(b)$. This implies that UP^T contains a rule $\Sigma \leftarrow \Gamma$ with $\Sigma \subseteq \mathcal{L}_P$ iff $((P \setminus F) \cup E)^T$ has the same rule. Put $S = T \cup \{+a \mid a \in E\} \cup \{-b, \bar{b} \mid b \in F\}$. Then, S is a consistent answer set of $UP \cup \{\leftarrow \text{not } G\}$, and $E^+ = S \cap \mathcal{U}\mathcal{A}^+$ and $F^- = S \cap \mathcal{U}\mathcal{A}^-$.
2. Suppose that S is a consistent U-minimal answer set of $UP \cup \{\leftarrow \text{not } G\}$ such that $E^+ = S \cap \mathcal{U}\mathcal{A}^+$ and $F^- = S \cap \mathcal{U}\mathcal{A}^-$. If the credulous explanation (E, F) of G is not minimal, there is a pair (E', F') such that $(E' \subset E$ and $F' \subseteq F)$ or $(E' \subseteq E$ and $F' \subset F)$, and $(P \setminus F') \cup E'$ has a consistent answer set T' in which G is true. Then, there is an answer set S' of $UP \cup \{\leftarrow \text{not } G\}$ such that $T' = S' \cap \mathcal{L}_P$ and $E'^+ = S' \cap \mathcal{U}\mathcal{A}^+$ and $F'^- = S' \cap \mathcal{U}\mathcal{A}^-$ by the only-if part of 1. By $E' \cup F' \subset E \cup F$, $E'^+ \cup F'^- \subset E^+ \cup F^-$ holds. Thus, $S' \cap \mathcal{U}\mathcal{A} \subset S \cap \mathcal{U}\mathcal{A}$. This contradicts the assumption that S is U-minimal. Conversely, when (E, F) is a minimal credulous explanation of G , $UP \cup \{\leftarrow \text{not } G\}$ has a consistent answer set S such that $E^+ = S \cap \mathcal{U}\mathcal{A}^+$ and $F^- = S \cap \mathcal{U}\mathcal{A}^-$ (by 1). Suppose that

S is not U-minimal. Then, $UP \cup \{\leftarrow not G\}$ has a consistent U-minimal answer set S' such that $S' \cap \mathcal{U}\mathcal{A} \subset S \cap \mathcal{U}\mathcal{A}$, $E'^+ = S' \cap \mathcal{U}\mathcal{A}^+$, and $F'^- = S' \cap \mathcal{U}\mathcal{A}^-$. In this case, there is a minimal credulous explanation (E', F') of G such that $E' \cup F' \subset E \cup F$ by the if-part of 2. This contradicts the fact that (E, F) is minimal. Hence, the result holds.

□

Theorem 3.4 (computing skeptical explanations by UP)

Let $\langle P, \mathcal{A} \rangle$ be an abductive program, UP its update program, and G a positive observation. Then, G has a skeptical explanation (E, F) iff $UP \cup \{\leftarrow not G\}$ has a consistent answer set S such that $E^+ = S \cap \mathcal{U}\mathcal{A}^+$, $F^- = S \cap \mathcal{U}\mathcal{A}^-$, and $(P \setminus F) \cup E \cup \{\leftarrow G\}$ is inconsistent. In particular, (E, F) is a minimal skeptical explanation iff S is U-minimal among those satisfying the above condition.

Proof

Suppose that S is a consistent answer set of $UP \cup \{\leftarrow not G\}$ satisfying the condition that $E^+ = S \cap \mathcal{U}\mathcal{A}^+$, $F^- = S \cap \mathcal{U}\mathcal{A}^-$, and $(P \setminus F) \cup E \cup \{\leftarrow G\}$ is inconsistent. Then, (E, F) is a credulous explanation of G (Theorem 3.3), and also a skeptical explanation of G (Proposition 3.2). In particular, if S is U-minimal among those satisfying the condition, (E, F) becomes a minimal skeptical explanation by Theorem 3.3.

Conversely, suppose that (E, F) is a skeptical explanation of G . By Proposition 3.2 and Theorem 3.3, there is a consistent answer set S of $UP \cup \{\leftarrow not G\}$ such that $E^+ = S \cap \mathcal{U}\mathcal{A}^+$, $F^- = S \cap \mathcal{U}\mathcal{A}^-$, and $(P \setminus F) \cup E \cup \{\leftarrow G\}$ is inconsistent. Suppose that (E, F) is a minimal skeptical explanation of G . To see that S is U-minimal among those satisfying the condition, suppose that there is an answer set S' which satisfies the condition and $S' \cap \mathcal{U}\mathcal{A} \subset S \cap \mathcal{U}\mathcal{A}$. Put $E'^+ = S' \cap \mathcal{U}\mathcal{A}^+$ and $F'^- = S' \cap \mathcal{U}\mathcal{A}^-$. Then, $E'^+ \cup F'^- \subset E^+ \cup F^-$, thereby $E' \cup F' \subset E \cup F$. As (E', F') is a skeptical explanation of G by Proposition 3.2 and Theorem 3.3, this contradicts the assumption that (E, F) is minimal. □

Example 3.3

For the abductive program of Example 3.2, UP becomes

$$\begin{aligned}
 UP : \quad & p ; q \leftarrow a, \\
 & \neg q \leftarrow not b, \\
 & abd(a), \quad abd(b), \\
 & +a \leftarrow a, \\
 & -b \leftarrow not b.
 \end{aligned}$$

For the positive observation p , the program $UP \cup \{\leftarrow not p\}$ has the answer set $S = \{p, a, \bar{b}, +a, -b\}$ such that $E^+ = \{+a\}$, $F^- = \{-b\}$, and $(P \setminus F) \cup E \cup \{\leftarrow p\}$ is inconsistent with $(E, F) = (\{a\}, \{b\})$. Since S is also U-minimal satisfying this condition, $(\{a\}, \{b\})$ is the minimal skeptical explanation of p . On the other hand, $UP \cup \{\leftarrow not p\}$ has another answer set $S' = \{p, a, b, +a\}$ such that $E^+ = \{+a\}$ and $F^- = \emptyset$. However, $(P \setminus F) \cup E \cup \{\leftarrow p\}$ is consistent with $(E, F) = (\{a\}, \{\})$, so that $(\{a\}, \{\})$ is not a skeptical explanation (but a credulous one).

The above results present that (minimal) explanations of extended abduction are computed by means of answer sets of an update program which is an EDP. In particular, when a program P is an ELP (resp. NDP, NLP), explanations are computed by means of answer sets (resp. stable models) of the corresponding update program which is also an ELP (resp. NDP, NLP).

For computing anti-explanations, we have the following results.

Lemma 3.5 (converting anti-explanations to explanations)

Let $\langle P, \mathcal{A} \rangle$ be an abductive program and G a negative observation. Then, (E, F) is a (minimal) credulous/skeptical anti-explanation of G with respect to $\langle P, \mathcal{A} \rangle$ iff (E, F) is a (minimal) credulous/skeptical explanation of a positive observation G' with respect to the abductive program $\langle P \cup \{G' \leftarrow \text{not } G\}, \mathcal{A} \rangle$, where G' is a ground atom appearing nowhere in $P \cup \mathcal{A}$.

In particular, (E, F) is a (minimal) credulous anti-explanation of $G = \perp$ with respect to $\langle P, \mathcal{A} \rangle$ iff (E, F) is a (minimal) credulous explanation of a positive observation G' with respect to the abductive program $\langle P \cup \{G' \leftarrow \text{not } \perp\}, \mathcal{A} \rangle$.

Proof

Put $P' = P \cup \{G' \leftarrow \text{not } G\}$. Then, G is not included in an answer set S of a consistent program $(P \setminus F) \cup E$ iff G' is included in an answer set $S \cup \{G'\}$ of a consistent program $(P' \setminus F) \cup E$. Hence, the result follows. In particular, when $G = \perp$, $(P \setminus F) \cup E$ is consistent iff G' is included in a consistent answer set of $(P' \setminus F) \cup E$. \square

Theorem 3.6 (computing anti-explanations through UP)

Let $\langle P, \mathcal{A} \rangle$ be an abductive program, UP its update program, and G a negative observation. Also, let G' be a ground atom appearing nowhere in $P \cup \mathcal{A}$, and $P' = P \cup \{G' \leftarrow \text{not } G\}$. Then,

1. (E, F) is a (minimal) credulous anti-explanation of G iff $UP \cup \{\leftarrow G\}$ has a consistent (U-minimal) answer set S such that $E^+ = S \cap \mathcal{U}\mathcal{A}^+$ and $F^- = S \cap \mathcal{U}\mathcal{A}^-$.
2. (E, F) is a skeptical anti-explanation of G iff $UP \cup \{G' \leftarrow \text{not } G\} \cup \{\leftarrow \text{not } G'\}$ has a consistent answer set S such that $E^+ = S \cap \mathcal{U}\mathcal{A}^+$, $F^- = S \cap \mathcal{U}\mathcal{A}^-$, and $(P' \setminus F) \cup E \cup \{\leftarrow G'\}$ is inconsistent. In particular, (E, F) is a minimal skeptical anti-explanation iff S is U-minimal among those satisfying the above condition.

Proof

1. Put $UP' = UP \cup \{G' \leftarrow \text{not } G\}$. Then, (E, F) is a (minimal) credulous anti-explanation of G with respect to $\langle P, \mathcal{A} \rangle$ iff (E, F) is a (minimal) credulous explanation of a positive observation G' with respect to $\langle P', \mathcal{A} \rangle$ (Lemma 3.5) iff $UP' \cup \{\leftarrow \text{not } G'\}$ has a consistent (U-minimal) answer set $S \cup \{G'\}$ such that $E^+ = S \cap \mathcal{U}\mathcal{A}^+$ and $F^- = S \cap \mathcal{U}\mathcal{A}^-$ (by Theorem 3.3). When $UP' \cup \{\leftarrow \text{not } G'\}$ has a consistent (U-minimal) answer set $S \cup \{G'\}$, G is not included in S . So $UP' \cup \{\leftarrow \text{not } G'\}$ has a consistent (U-minimal) answer set $S \cup \{G'\}$ such that $E^+ = S \cap \mathcal{U}\mathcal{A}^+$ and $F^- = S \cap \mathcal{U}\mathcal{A}^-$ iff $UP \cup \{\leftarrow G\}$

has a consistent (U-minimal) answer set S such that $E^+ = S \cap \mathcal{U}\mathcal{A}^+$ and $F^- = S \cap \mathcal{U}\mathcal{A}^-$.

2. (E, F) is a skeptical anti-explanation of G with respect to $\langle P, \mathcal{A} \rangle$ iff (E, F) is a skeptical explanation of a positive observation G' with respect to $\langle P', \mathcal{A} \rangle$ (Lemma 3.5) iff $UP' \cup \{\leftarrow \text{not } G'\}$ has a consistent answer set S such that $E^+ = S \cap \mathcal{U}\mathcal{A}^+$, $F^- = S \cap \mathcal{U}\mathcal{A}^-$, and $(P' \setminus F) \cup E \cup \{\leftarrow G'\}$ is inconsistent. In particular, (E, F) is a minimal skeptical anti-explanation iff S is U-minimal among those satisfying the above condition (Theorem 3.4).

□

Suppose an abductive program $\langle P, \mathcal{A} \rangle$ such that P is a normal logic program and \mathcal{A} is a set of atoms. When P is *locally stratified* in the sense of (Przymusinski, 1988), P has at most one answer set (called a *perfect model*). In this case, the above results are simplified as follows.⁵

Corollary 3.7 (computing (anti-)explanations in locally stratified NLPs)

Let $\langle P, \mathcal{A} \rangle$ be an abductive program in which P is a locally stratified NLP and \mathcal{A} is the set of abducible atoms. Also, let UP be the update program of $\langle P, \mathcal{A} \rangle$ and G a ground atom. Then,

1. A positive observation G has a (minimal) explanation (E, F) iff the program $UP \cup \{\leftarrow \text{not } G\}$ has a consistent (U-minimal) answer set S such that $E^+ = S \cap \mathcal{U}\mathcal{A}^+$ and $F^- = S \cap \mathcal{U}\mathcal{A}^-$.
2. A negative observation G has a (minimal) anti-explanation (E, F) iff the program $UP \cup \{\leftarrow G\}$ has a consistent (U-minimal) answer set S such that $E^+ = S \cap \mathcal{U}\mathcal{A}^+$ and $F^- = S \cap \mathcal{U}\mathcal{A}^-$.

Proof

When P is a locally stratified NLP, so is $(P \setminus F) \cup E$ because introducing/deleting facts to/from P does not break the stratification structure. Then $(P \setminus F) \cup E$ has at most one answer set. In this case, credulous (anti-)explanations and skeptical (anti-)explanations coincide. Hence, the results hold by Theorems 3.3 and 3.6. □

The results of Theorems 3.3, 3.4 and 3.6 imply that any proof procedure for computing answer sets in EDPs is used for computing (anti-)explanations of extended abduction in EDPs. In particular, minimal (anti-)explanations are found by an additional mechanism of filtering U-minimal ones out of answer sets.

4 View updates through extended abduction

In this section, we characterize the problem of view updates through extended abduction. We compute view updates by means of update programs in section 4.1, and realize the task of integrity maintenance as a special case in section 4.2.

⁵ The result is generalized to the class of programs having at most one stable model.

4.1 View updates

Suppose a knowledge base which contains variable rules and invariable rules. When there is a request for inserting/deleting a fact to/from the program, the update on the fact which is derived by invariable rules is translated into updates on variable rules/facts. This type of updates is called view updates.

Definition 4.1 (view updates)

Let P be a program, V the set of variable rules in the language of P , and G a ground fact. Then, a program P' accomplishes a *view update* for the *insertion* (resp. *deletion*) of G to/from P if

1. P' is consistent,
2. $P' \models G$ (resp. $P' \not\models G$),
3. $P' \setminus V = P \setminus V$,
4. there is no consistent program P'' such that $P'' \models G$ (resp. $P'' \not\models G$),
 $P'' \setminus V = P \setminus V$, and $[(P \cap V) \sim (P'' \cap V)] \subseteq [(P \cap V) \sim (P' \cap V)]$,
 where $Q \sim R = (Q \setminus R) \cup (R \setminus Q)$.

By the definition, the updated program P' is a consistent program which minimally changes the variable part V of P to (un)imply G . Such a program P' is obtained from P by deleting some rules in $V \cap P$ and introducing some rules in $V \setminus P$. In particular, when $G \in V \setminus P$ (resp. $G \in V \cap P$), the insertion (resp. deletion) is done by directly introducing (resp. deleting) G to/from P . We do not consider introducing rules in $V \cap P$ and deleting rules in $V \setminus P$, because introducing any rule which already exists in P is redundant and deleting any rule which does not exist in P is meaningless. With this assumption, the third condition $P' \setminus V = P \setminus V$ of Definition 4.1 is equivalent to

$$P' = (P \setminus F) \cup E \quad \text{for } E \subseteq V \setminus P \quad \text{and } F \subseteq V \cap P.$$

The view update problem is then naturally expressed by an abductive program $\langle P, V \rangle$, where the program P represents a knowledge base and the abducibles V represent variable rules.

Theorem 4.1 (view updates by extended abduction)

Let P be a program and V the set of variable rules in the language of P . Given a ground literal G , $(P \setminus F) \cup E$ accomplishes a view update for inserting (resp. deleting) G iff (E, F) is a minimal skeptical explanation (resp. minimal credulous anti-explanation) of the positive observation (resp. negative observation) G with respect to the abductive program $\langle P, V \rangle$.

Proof

Suppose that $P' = (P \setminus F) \cup E$ accomplishes the insertion (resp. deletion) of G . Then, P' is consistent and $P' \models G$ (resp. $P' \not\models G$). As $E \subseteq V \setminus P$ and $F \subseteq V \cap P$, (E, F) is a skeptical explanation (resp. credulous anti-explanation) of G with respect to $\langle P, V \rangle$. On the other hand, it holds that $(P' \cap V) \setminus (P \cap V) = E$ and $(P \cap V) \setminus (P' \cap V) = F$. Then, by the fourth condition of view updates, there is no $E' \subseteq V \setminus P$ nor $F' \subseteq V \cap P$ such that $(P \setminus F') \cup E' \models G$ (resp. $(P \setminus F') \cup E' \not\models G$) with a consistent $(P \setminus F') \cup E'$,

and $E' \cup F' \subset E \cup F$. If $(P \setminus F') \cup E'$ is consistent and $(P \setminus F') \cup E' \models G$ (resp. $(P \setminus F') \cup E' \not\models G$), then $E' \subseteq E$ and $F' \subseteq F$ imply $E' = E$ and $F' = F$, because otherwise $E' \cup F' \subset E \cup F$. Thus, (E, F) is a minimal skeptical explanation (resp. minimal credulous anti-explanation) of G with respect to $\langle P, V \rangle$. The converse is obvious by the definition of minimal (anti-)explanations. \square

To realize view updates through update programs, we first transform the abductive program $\langle P, V \rangle$ to its normal form $\langle P^n, V^n \rangle$ with abducible facts V^n as presented in section 2.2. For $E \subseteq V$ and $F \subseteq V$, we define $n(E)^+ = \{+a \mid a \in n(E)\}$ and $n(F)^- = \{-a \mid a \in n(F)\}$, where $n(\cdot)$ is the naming function introduced in section 2.2. Then, the following results hold.

Theorem 4.2 (view insertion through UP)

Let P be a program, V the set of variable rules in the language of P , and G a ground literal. Also, let $\langle P^n, V^n \rangle$ be the normal form of the abductive program $\langle P, V \rangle$, and UP the update program of $\langle P^n, V^n \rangle$. Then, $(P \setminus F) \cup E$ accomplishes the insertion of G iff

1. S is a consistent answer set of $UP \cup \{\leftarrow not G\}$ such that $n(E)^+ = S \cap \mathcal{U}\mathcal{A}^+$, $n(F)^- = S \cap \mathcal{U}\mathcal{A}^-$, and $(P \setminus F) \cup E \cup \{\leftarrow G\}$ is inconsistent, and
2. S is U-minimal among those satisfying the condition 1.

Proof

$(P \setminus F) \cup E$ accomplishes the insertion of G
 iff (E, F) is a minimal skeptical explanation of G with respect to $\langle P, V \rangle$ (Theorem 4.1)
 iff $(n(E), n(F))$ is a minimal skeptical explanation of G with respect to $\langle P^n, V^n \rangle$ (Proposition 2.1)
 iff there exists a consistent U-minimal answer set S of $UP \cup \{\leftarrow not G\}$ satisfying the conditions 1 and 2 (Theorem 3.4). \square

Theorem 4.3 (view deletion through UP)

Let P be a program, V the set of variable rules in the language of P , and G a ground literal. Also, let $\langle P^n, V^n \rangle$ be the normal form of the abductive program $\langle P, V \rangle$, and let UP be the update program of $\langle P^n, V^n \rangle$. Then, $(P \setminus F) \cup E$ accomplishes the deletion of G iff $UP \cup \{\leftarrow G\}$ has a consistent U-minimal answer set S such that $n(E)^+ = S \cap \mathcal{U}\mathcal{A}^+$ and $n(F)^- = S \cap \mathcal{U}\mathcal{A}^-$.

Proof

$(P \setminus F) \cup E$ accomplishes the deletion of G
 iff (E, F) is a minimal credulous anti-explanation of G with respect to $\langle P, V \rangle$ (Theorem 4.1)
 iff $(n(E), n(F))$ is a minimal credulous anti-explanation of G with respect to $\langle P^n, V^n \rangle$ (Proposition 2.1)
 iff S is a consistent U-minimal answer set of $UP \cup \{\leftarrow G\}$ such that $n(E)^+ = S \cap \mathcal{U}\mathcal{A}^+$ and $n(F)^- = S \cap \mathcal{U}\mathcal{A}^-$ (Theorem 3.6). \square

Example 4.1

Let P be the program and V the set of variable rules such that

$$\begin{aligned}
 P : \quad & \text{flies}(x) \leftarrow \text{bird}(x), \text{not } ab(x), \\
 & ab(x) \leftarrow \text{broken-wing}(x), \\
 & \text{bird}(\text{tweety}) \leftarrow , \\
 & \text{bird}(\text{opus}) \leftarrow , \\
 & \text{broken-wing}(\text{tweety}) \leftarrow . \\
 V : \quad & \text{broken-wing}(x).
 \end{aligned}$$

Then, UP becomes

$$\begin{aligned}
 UP : \quad & \text{flies}(x) \leftarrow \text{bird}(x), \text{not } ab(x), \\
 & ab(x) \leftarrow \text{broken-wing}(x), \\
 & \text{bird}(\text{tweety}) \leftarrow , \\
 & \text{bird}(\text{opus}) \leftarrow , \\
 & abd(\text{broken-wing}(\text{tweety})), \quad abd(\text{broken-wing}(\text{opus})), \\
 & -\text{broken-wing}(\text{tweety}) \leftarrow \text{not } \text{broken-wing}(\text{tweety}), \\
 & +\text{broken-wing}(\text{opus}) \leftarrow \text{broken-wing}(\text{opus}).
 \end{aligned}$$

To insert $\text{flies}(\text{tweety})$, the U-minimal answer set of $UP \cup \{ \leftarrow \text{not } \text{flies}(\text{tweety}) \}$ becomes $\{ \text{flies}(\text{tweety}), \text{flies}(\text{opus}), \text{bird}(\text{tweety}), \text{bird}(\text{opus}), \overline{\text{broken-wing}(\text{tweety})}, \overline{\text{broken-wing}(\text{opus})}, -\text{broken-wing}(\text{tweety}) \}$. Then, $(P \setminus F) \cup E$ accomplishes the insertion of $\text{flies}(\text{tweety})$ with $(E, F) = (\emptyset, \{ \text{broken-wing}(\text{tweety}) \})$.

On the other hand, to remove $\text{flies}(\text{opus})$, the U-minimal answer set of $UP \cup \{ \leftarrow \text{flies}(\text{opus}) \}$ becomes $\{ \text{bird}(\text{tweety}), \text{bird}(\text{opus}), \text{broken-wing}(\text{tweety}), \text{broken-wing}(\text{opus}), ab(\text{tweety}), ab(\text{opus}), +\text{broken-wing}(\text{opus}) \}$. Then, $(P \setminus F) \cup E$ accomplishes the deletion of $\text{flies}(\text{opus})$ with $(E, F) = (\{ \text{broken-wing}(\text{opus}) \}, \emptyset)$.

4.2 Integrity maintenance

Integrity constraints are conditions that a knowledge base should satisfy through updates. When integrity constraints are violated, variable rules/facts are modified to restore consistency. Such *integrity maintenance* is done as a special case of view updating.

Let I be the set of integrity constraints in a program P . Then, we say that P *violates* integrity constraints from I if $P \setminus I$ has no consistent answer set satisfying every rule in I . P *satisfies* integrity constraints from I if P does not violate them.⁶

Definition 4.2 (integrity maintenance)

Let P be a program and V the set of variable rules in the language of P . Also, let I be the set of integrity constraints such that $I \subseteq P \setminus V$. Then, a program P' *restores*

⁶ This is the *consistency view* of integrity satisfaction (Sadri and Kowalski, 1988).

consistency with respect to I if

1. P' is consistent,
2. $P' \setminus V = P \setminus V$,
3. there is no consistent program P'' such that $P'' \setminus V = P \setminus V$ and $[(P \cap V) \sim (P'' \cap V)] \subset [(P \cap V) \sim (P' \cap V)]$.

In particular, $P' = P$ if P satisfies every integrity constraint in I .

The first condition implies that P' satisfies every constraint in I . Note that by $I \subseteq P \setminus V$ every constraint in I is invariable, so $I \subseteq P'$ holds by the second condition. The third condition requests the minimality of change. By the definition, integrity maintenance is defined as a special case of view deletion of Definition 4.1 with $G = \perp$, i.e. $P' \not\models \perp$ is equivalent to the first condition. Then, the problem of integrity maintenance is characterized by an abductive program $\langle P, V \rangle$ and computed by its update program. The following results directly follow from Theorem 4.1 and Theorem 4.3.

Theorem 4.4 (integrity maintenance by extended abduction)

Let P be a program, $I \subseteq P$ integrity constraints, and V the set of variable rules in the language of P . Then, $(P \setminus F) \cup E$ restores consistency with respect to I iff (E, F) is a minimal credulous anti-explanation of the negative observation $G = \perp$ with respect to $\langle P, V \rangle$.

Theorem 4.5 (integrity maintenance through UP)

Let P be a program, $I \subseteq P$ integrity constraints, and V the set of variable rules in the language of P . Also, let $\langle P^n, V^n \rangle$ be the normal form of the abductive program $\langle P, V \rangle$, and UP the update program of $\langle P^n, V^n \rangle$. Then, $(P \setminus F) \cup E$ restores consistency with respect to I iff UP has a consistent U-minimal answer set S such that $n(E)^+ = S \cap \mathcal{U}\mathcal{A}^+$ and $n(F)^- = S \cap \mathcal{U}\mathcal{A}^-$.

Example 4.2

Let $\langle P, V \rangle$ be the abductive program such that

- P :
- $employee(john, 35) \leftarrow,$
 - $manager(john) \leftarrow,$
 - $\leftarrow employee(x, y), manager(x), not\ talented(x), y < 40.$
- V :
- $manager(x), talented(x).$

The integrity constraint enforces the condition that any employee does not become a manager under the age 40 unless he/she is talented. The UP of this program becomes

- UP :
- $employee(john, 35) \leftarrow,$
 - $\leftarrow employee(x, y), manager(x), not\ talented(x), y < 40.$
 - $abd(manager(x)), abd(talented(x)),$
 - $-manager(john) \leftarrow not\ manager(john),$
 - $+talented(x) \leftarrow talented(x),$

which has two U-minimal answer sets:

$$\begin{aligned} & \{ \text{employee}(\text{john}, 35), \overline{\text{manager}(\text{john})}, \overline{-\text{manager}(\text{john})}, \overline{\text{talented}(\text{john})} \}, \\ & \{ \text{employee}(\text{john}, 35), \text{manager}(\text{john}), +\text{talented}(\text{john}), \text{talented}(\text{john}) \}. \end{aligned}$$

That is, removing $\text{manager}(\text{john})$ or inserting $\text{talented}(\text{john})$ restores consistency with respect to the integrity constraint.

5 Theory updates

In this section, we characterize the problem of theory updates through extended abduction. We first consider updating a knowledge base by a single rule in section 5.1, then generalize the result to updating by a program in section 5.2. Inconsistency removal is formalized as a special case of theory updates in section 5.3.

5.1 Updates with a rule

Suppose that an update request for inserting/deleting a rule is brought to a knowledge base in which every rule is variable. In this case, an update is done by directly inserting/deleting the rule to/from the program.

Definition 5.1 (updates with a rule)

Let P be a program and R a rule such that $R \notin P$. Then, P' accomplishes the insertion of R to P if

1. P' is consistent,
2. $\{R\} \subseteq P' \subseteq P \cup \{R\}$,
3. there is no consistent program P'' such that $P' \subset P'' \subseteq P \cup \{R\}$.

On the other hand, for a program P and a rule R such that $R \in P$, P' accomplishes the deletion of R from P if

1. P' is consistent,
2. $P' \subseteq P \setminus \{R\}$,
3. there is no consistent program P'' such that $P' \subset P'' \subseteq P \setminus \{R\}$.

In the above definition, the second conditions present that the updated program P' includes/excludes the rule R , and the third conditions present that P' minimally changes the original program P by inserting/deleting R to/from P .

We first show that the problem of deleting a rule from a program in Definition 5.1 is converted to the problem of inserting a rule to a program.

Proposition 5.1 (converting deletion of a rule to insertion of a rule)

Let P be a program and R a rule in P . Then, there is a program P' which accomplishes the deletion of R from P iff there is a program PR' which accomplishes the insertion of the rule $\leftarrow \gamma_R$ to the program $PR = (P \setminus \{R\}) \cup \{\Sigma \leftarrow \Gamma, \gamma_R, \gamma_R \leftarrow\}$ where $R = (\Sigma \leftarrow \Gamma)$.

Proof

Suppose that P' accomplishes the deletion of R from P . Put $PR' = P' \cup \{\Sigma \leftarrow \Gamma, \gamma_R, \leftarrow \gamma_R\}$. Then, by $P' \subseteq P \setminus \{R\}$, $PR' \subseteq (P \setminus \{R\}) \cup \{\Sigma \leftarrow \Gamma, \gamma_R, \leftarrow \gamma_R\}$ holds, thereby $\{\leftarrow \gamma_R\} \subseteq PR' \subseteq PR \cup \{\leftarrow \gamma_R\}$. As P' is consistent, PR' is consistent. Assume that there is a consistent program PR'' such that $PR' \subset PR'' \subseteq PR \cup \{\leftarrow \gamma_R\}$. Put $P'' = PR'' \setminus \{\Sigma \leftarrow \Gamma, \gamma_R, \leftarrow \gamma_R\}$. Then, $PR'' \subseteq PR \cup \{\leftarrow \gamma_R\}$ implies $PR'' \subseteq (P \setminus \{R\}) \cup \{\Sigma \leftarrow \Gamma, \gamma_R, \gamma_R \leftarrow\} \cup \{\leftarrow \gamma_R\}$, thereby $P'' \subseteq P \setminus \{R\}$. On the other hand, $PR' \subset PR''$ implies $P' \cup \{\Sigma \leftarrow \Gamma, \gamma_R, \leftarrow \gamma_R\} \subset PR''$, thereby $P' \subset PR'' \setminus \{\Sigma \leftarrow \Gamma, \gamma_R, \leftarrow \gamma_R\}$. Then, $P' \subset P''$. Thus, $P' \subset P'' \subseteq P \setminus \{R\}$ holds, which contradicts the fact that there is no such P'' . Hence, PR' accomplishes the insertion of $\leftarrow \gamma_R$ to PR .

Conversely, suppose that PR' accomplishes the insertion of $\leftarrow \gamma_R$ to PR . Put $P' = PR' \setminus \{\Sigma \leftarrow \Gamma, \gamma_R, \leftarrow \gamma_R\}$. Then, by $PR' \subseteq PR \cup \{\leftarrow \gamma_R\}$, $P' \subseteq P \setminus \{R\}$ holds. As PR' is consistent, P' is consistent. Assume that there is a consistent program P'' such that $P' \subset P'' \subseteq P \setminus \{R\}$. Put $PR'' = P'' \cup \{\Sigma \leftarrow \Gamma, \gamma_R, \leftarrow \gamma_R\}$. Then, by $P' \cup \{\Sigma \leftarrow \Gamma, \gamma_R, \leftarrow \gamma_R\} = PR'$ and $P \setminus \{R\} \cup \{\Sigma \leftarrow \Gamma, \gamma_R, \leftarrow \gamma_R\} \subseteq PR \cup \{\leftarrow \gamma_R\}$, it holds that $PR' \subset PR'' \subseteq PR \cup \{\leftarrow \gamma_R\}$, which contradicts the fact that there is no such PR'' . Hence, P' accomplishes the deletion of R from P . \square

By Proposition 5.1, for updating a program with a rule, it is enough to consider the problem of inserting a rule to a program. We study the problem in a more general setting in the next subsection.

5.2 Updates with programs

This section considers an update which updates a program with another program. Given a program P which represents the current knowledge base and another program Q which represents new information, a theory update is defined to satisfy the following conditions.

Definition 5.2 (theory updates)

Given programs P and Q , P' accomplishes a *theory update* of P by Q if

1. P' is consistent,
2. $Q \subseteq P' \subseteq P \cup Q$,
3. there is no consistent program P'' such that $P' \subset P'' \subseteq P \cup Q$.

By the definition, the updated program P' is defined as the union of the new information Q and a maximal subset of the original program P which is consistent with Q . The first condition implies that new information Q should be consistent, namely, updating with inconsistent information makes no sense. With this definition, inserting a rule to a theory of Definition 5.1 is captured as a special case of a theory update of Definition 5.2 in which a new program Q is given as a single rule. In contrast to this, it is considered a theory update which is defined as the removal of Q from P like $P' \subseteq P \setminus Q$. For such updates, the transformation of Proposition 5.1 is applied for each rule in Q . Then the problem of removing Q is converted to the problem of introducing corresponding rules as in Definition 5.2.

To realize theory updates, an abductive framework is used for specifying priorities between the current knowledge and the new knowledge. Consider the abductive program $\langle P \cup Q, P \setminus Q \rangle$, where a program is given as $P \cup Q$ and any rule in the original program P other than the new information Q is specified as variable abducible rules.

Theorem 5.2 (theory updates by extended abduction)

Let P and Q be programs. Then, P' accomplishes a theory update of P by Q iff $P' = (P \cup Q) \setminus F$ where (\emptyset, F) is a minimal credulous anti-explanation of the negative observation $G = \perp$ with respect to the abductive program $\langle P \cup Q, P \setminus Q \rangle$.

Proof

P' accomplishes a theory update of P by Q

iff $P' = (P \cup Q) \setminus F$ where F is a minimal set such that $F \subseteq P \setminus Q$ and $(P \cup Q) \setminus F \not\models \perp$

iff $P' = (P \cup Q) \setminus F$ where (\emptyset, F) is a minimal credulous anti-explanation of the negative observation $G = \perp$ with respect to $\langle P \cup Q, P \setminus Q \rangle$. \square

The abductive program $\langle P \cup Q, P \setminus Q \rangle$ is transformed to the normal form $\langle (P \cup Q)^n, (P \setminus Q)^n \rangle$ where $(P \setminus Q)^n$ consists of abducible facts (section 2.2). Then, a minimal credulous anti-explanation of $G = \perp$ is computed by a consistent U-minimal answer set of the update program of $\langle (P \cup Q)^n, (P \setminus Q)^n \rangle$. Note that in $\langle (P \cup Q)^n, (P \setminus Q)^n \rangle$ it holds that $(P \setminus Q)^n \setminus (P \cup Q)^n = \emptyset$, so UP contains no rule of the form $+a \leftarrow a$ of Definition 3.1(2).

Theorem 5.3 (theory updates through UP)

Let P and Q be programs, and UP the update program of the abductive program $\langle (P \cup Q)^n, (P \setminus Q)^n \rangle$. Then, $(P \cup Q) \setminus F$ accomplishes a theory update of P by Q iff UP has a consistent U-minimal answer set S such that $n(F^-) = S \cap \mathcal{U}\mathcal{A}^-$.

Proof

$(P \cup Q) \setminus F$ accomplishes a theory update of P by Q

iff (\emptyset, F) is a minimal credulous anti-explanation of the negative observation $G = \perp$ with respect to $\langle P \cup Q, P \setminus Q \rangle$ (Theorem 5.2)

iff $(\emptyset, n(F))$ is a minimal credulous anti-explanation of $G = \perp$ with respect to $\langle (P \cup Q)^n, (P \setminus Q)^n \rangle$ (Proposition 2.1)

iff $UP \cup \{\leftarrow \perp\}$ has a consistent U-minimal answer set S such that $n(F^-) = S \cap \mathcal{U}\mathcal{A}^-$ (Theorem 3.6).

iff UP has a consistent U-minimal answer set S such that $n(F^-) = S \cap \mathcal{U}\mathcal{A}^-$. \square

Example 5.1 (Alferes et al. (2000))

Given the current knowledge base

$$\begin{aligned}
 P_1 : \quad & \text{sleep} \leftarrow \text{not tv_on}, \\
 & \text{watch_tv} \leftarrow \text{tv_on}, \\
 & \text{tv_on} \leftarrow,
 \end{aligned}$$

consider updating P_1 with⁷

$$P_2 : \quad \text{power_failure} \leftarrow , \\ \leftarrow \text{power_failure}, \text{tv_on} .$$

The situation is expressed by the abductive program $\langle P_1 \cup P_2, P_1 \setminus P_2 \rangle$. The update program UP of $\langle (P_1 \cup P_2)^n, (P_1 \setminus P_2)^n \rangle$ then becomes

$$UP : \quad \text{power_failure} \leftarrow , \\ \leftarrow \text{power_failure}, \text{tv_on} , \\ \text{sleep} \leftarrow \text{not tv_on}, \gamma_1 , \\ \text{watch_tv} \leftarrow \text{tv_on}, \gamma_2 , \\ \text{abd}(\text{tv_on}), \text{abd}(\gamma_1), \text{abd}(\gamma_2), \\ \text{--tv_on} \leftarrow \text{not tv_on} , \\ \text{--}\gamma_1 \leftarrow \text{not } \gamma_1 , \\ \text{--}\gamma_2 \leftarrow \text{not } \gamma_2 ,$$

where γ_1 and γ_2 are the names of the abducible rules in $P_1 \setminus P_2$. Then, UP has the unique U-minimal answer set $\{\text{power_failure}, \text{sleep}, \overline{\text{tv_on}}, \text{--tv_on}, \gamma_1, \gamma_2\}$, which represents the deletion of the fact tv_on from $P_1 \cup P_2$. As a result, the theory update of P_1 by P_2 becomes

$$P_3 : \quad \text{sleep} \leftarrow \text{not tv_on} , \\ \text{watch_tv} \leftarrow \text{tv_on} , \\ \text{power_failure} \leftarrow , \\ \leftarrow \text{power_failure}, \text{tv_on} .$$

Next, suppose that another update

$$P_4 : \quad \neg \text{power_failure} \leftarrow$$

is given to P_3 which states that power is back again. The situation is expressed by the abductive program $\langle P_3 \cup P_4, P_3 \setminus P_4 \rangle$, and the update program of $\langle (P_3 \cup P_4)^n, (P_3 \setminus P_4)^n \rangle$ becomes

$$UP : \quad \neg \text{power_failure} \leftarrow , \\ \text{sleep} \leftarrow \text{not tv_on}, \gamma_1 , \\ \text{watch_tv} \leftarrow \text{tv_on}, \gamma_2 , \\ \leftarrow \text{power_failure}, \text{tv_on}, \gamma_3 , \\ \text{abd}(\text{power_failure}), \text{abd}(\gamma_1), \text{abd}(\gamma_2), \text{abd}(\gamma_3), \\ \text{--power_failure} \leftarrow \text{not power_failure} , \\ \text{--}\gamma_1 \leftarrow \text{not } \gamma_1, \text{--}\gamma_2 \leftarrow \text{not } \gamma_2, \text{--}\gamma_3 \leftarrow \text{not } \gamma_3 .$$

⁷ In (Alferes *et al.*, 2000) the rule “ $\leftarrow \text{power_failure}, \text{tv_on}$ ” is given as “ $\text{not tv_on} \leftarrow \text{power_failure}$ ”. These two rules are semantically equivalent under the answer set semantics (Inoue and Sakama, 1998).

Then, UP has the unique U-minimal answer set $\{\neg power_failure, sleep, \gamma_1, \gamma_2, \gamma_3, \overline{power_failure}, \neg power_failure\}$, which implies that the result of the update is $(P_3 \cup P_4) \setminus \{power_failure \leftarrow\}$.

Generally, there are several solutions for updating a program P by Q . For example, let $P = \{p \leftarrow q, q \leftarrow\}$ and $Q = \{\neg p \leftarrow\}$. Then, there are two solutions of updating P by Q ; removing either $p \leftarrow q$ or $q \leftarrow$ from P . Every answer set which results from multiple solutions is expressed by a single program as follows.

Suppose updating P by Q . Then, define the program

$$\Pi = Q \cup \{\Sigma \leftarrow \Gamma, \gamma_R, abd(\gamma_R) \mid R = (\Sigma \leftarrow \Gamma) \in P\}.$$

Let $\Delta = \{\gamma_R \mid \gamma_R \text{ appears in } \Pi\}$. A consistent answer set S of Π is called Δ -maximal if S is an answer set of Π such that $T \cap \Delta \subseteq S \cap \Delta$ for any answer set T of Π . Let $\mathcal{L}_{P \cup Q}$ be the set of all ground literals in the language of the program $P \cup Q$. Then the following result holds.

Theorem 5.4 (representing multiple solutions in a single program)

Let P and Q be programs and P' a result of a theory update of P by Q . Also, let Π be a program defined as above. Then, for any answer set S of P' , there is a Δ -maximal answer set T of Π such that $S = T \cap \mathcal{L}_{P \cup Q}$. Conversely, for any Δ -maximal answer set T of Π , there is a program P' which has an answer set S such that $S = T \cap \mathcal{L}_{P \cup Q}$.

Proof

When P' accomplishes a theory update of P by Q , $P' = Q \cup P''$ where P'' is a maximal subset of P such that $Q \cup P''$ is consistent. Consider the program $\Pi' = Q \cup \{\Sigma \leftarrow \Gamma, \gamma_R, \gamma_R \leftarrow \mid R = (\Sigma \leftarrow \Gamma) \in P''\}$. Then, for any answer set S of P' , there is an answer set T' of Π' such that $S = T' \cap \mathcal{L}_{P \cup Q}$. In this case, there is an answer set T of Π such that $T = T' \cup \{\overline{\gamma_R} \mid \gamma_R \in \Delta \setminus T'\}$. Suppose that T is not Δ -maximal. Then, there is an answer set T'' of Π such that $T' \cap \Delta \subset T'' \cap \Delta$. In this case, there is a consistent answer set S' of $Q \cup P'''$ such that $S' = T'' \cap \mathcal{L}_{P \cup Q}$ and $P'' \subset P''' \subseteq P$. This contradicts the assumption that P'' is a maximal subset of P such that $Q \cup P''$ is consistent. Hence, T is a Δ -maximal answer set of Π . The converse is shown in a similar manner. \square

Example 5.2

In the above example, the program Π becomes

$$\begin{aligned} \Pi : \quad & \neg p \leftarrow, \\ & p \leftarrow q, \gamma_1, \\ & q \leftarrow \gamma_2, \\ & abd(\gamma_1), abd(\gamma_2). \end{aligned}$$

Then, the Δ -maximal answer sets of Π are $\{\neg p, \gamma_1, \overline{\gamma_2}\}$ and $\{\neg p, q, \overline{\gamma_1}, \gamma_2\}$, which correspond to the answer sets of the updated programs $\{p \leftarrow q, \neg p \leftarrow\}$ and $\{q \leftarrow, \neg p \leftarrow\}$, respectively.

5.3 Inconsistency removal

A knowledge base may become inconsistent by the presence of contradictory information. In this situation, a knowledge base must be updated to restore consistency by detecting the source of inconsistency in the program. Such an inconsistency removal is defined as follows.

Definition 5.3 (inconsistency removal)

Let P be a program. Then, a program P' accomplishes an *inconsistency removal* of P if

1. P' is consistent,
2. $P' \subseteq P$,
3. there is no consistent program P'' such that $P' \subset P'' \subseteq P$.

In particular, $P' = P$ if P is consistent.

By the definition, inconsistency removal is captured as a special case of theory updates where P is possibly inconsistent and Q is empty in Definition 5.2. Then, by putting $Q = \emptyset$ in $\langle P \cup Q, P \setminus Q \rangle$, inconsistency removal is characterized by the abductive program $\langle P, P \rangle$. The next theorem directly follows from Theorem 5.2.

Theorem 5.5 (inconsistency removal by extended abduction)

Let P be a program. Then, P' accomplishes an inconsistency removal of P iff $P' = P \setminus F$ where (\emptyset, F) is a minimal credulous anti-explanation of the negative observation $G = \perp$ with respect to the abductive program $\langle P, P \rangle$.

In an EDP, inconsistency arises when a program P has the contradictory answer set \mathcal{L}_P or P has no answer set. An abductive program $\langle P, P \rangle$ can remove these different types of inconsistencies.

Example 5.3

Let $P = \{p \leftarrow \text{not } p, q \leftarrow\}$ which has no answer set. Then, $G = \perp$ has the minimal credulous (and also skeptical) anti-explanation $(E, F) = (\emptyset, \{p \leftarrow \text{not } p\})$ with respect to $\langle P, P \rangle$. As a result, $P' = \{q \leftarrow\}$ accomplishes an inconsistency removal of P .

The following result holds by Theorem 5.3.

Theorem 5.6 (inconsistency removal through UP)

Let P be a program and UP the update program of the abductive program $\langle P^n, P^n \rangle$ which is a normal form of $\langle P, P \rangle$. Then, $P \setminus F$ accomplishes an inconsistency removal of P iff UP has a consistent U-minimal answer set S such that $n(F^-) = S \cap \mathcal{U}\mathcal{A}^-$.

Example 5.4

Let P be the program

$$\begin{aligned} & \text{pacifist} \leftarrow \text{quaker}, \\ & \neg \text{pacifist} \leftarrow \text{republican}, \\ & \text{quaker} \leftarrow, \text{republican} \leftarrow, \end{aligned}$$

which has the answer set \mathcal{L}_P . Consider the update program UP of the abductive program $\langle P^n, P^n \rangle$:

$$\begin{aligned}
 UP : \quad & pacifist \leftarrow quaker, \gamma_1, \\
 & \neg pacifist \leftarrow republican, \gamma_2, \\
 & abd(\gamma_1), abd(\gamma_2), abd(quaker), abd(republican), \\
 & -\gamma_1 \leftarrow not \gamma_1, \\
 & -\gamma_2 \leftarrow not \gamma_2, \\
 & -quaker \leftarrow not quaker, \\
 & -republican \leftarrow not republican.
 \end{aligned}$$

Then, UP has four U-minimal answer sets:

$$\begin{aligned}
 & \{ quaker, republican, pacifist, \gamma_1, \overline{\gamma_2}, -\gamma_2 \}, \\
 & \{ quaker, republican, \neg pacifist, \overline{\gamma_1}, \gamma_2, -\gamma_1 \}, \\
 & \{ \overline{quaker}, republican, \gamma_1, \gamma_2, \neg pacifist, -quaker \}, \\
 & \{ quaker, \overline{republican}, pacifist, \gamma_1, \gamma_2, -republican \},
 \end{aligned}$$

which represent that deletion of one of the rules (or facts) from P makes the program consistent.

The multiplicity of possible solutions as in the above example is expressed by a single program using the technique of Theorem 5.4. On the other hand, if one wants to restrict the set of rules to be removed, it is done by considering an abductive program $\langle P, P' \rangle$ with $P' \subseteq P$. In this case, any rule in P' is subject to change to recover consistency.

6 Computational complexity

In this section, we compare the computational complexity of different types of updates. Throughout the section, we consider propositional abductive programs, i.e., an abductive program $\langle P, \mathcal{A} \rangle$ where P is a finite EDP containing no variable and \mathcal{A} is a finite set of ground literals. An observation G is a ground literal. We also assume an abductive program $\langle P, \mathcal{A} \rangle$ where \mathcal{A} consists of abducible facts. An abductive program with abducible rules is transformed to an abductive program with abducible facts by considering its normal form (see section 2.2).

We first investigate the complexity of extended abduction. The decision problems considered here are analogous to those of Eiter *et al.* (1997), that is, given an abductive program $\langle P, \mathcal{A} \rangle$ and a positive/negative observation G :

Existence: Does G have an (anti-)explanation with respect to $\langle P, \mathcal{A} \rangle$?

Relevance: Is a given abducible $A \in \mathcal{A}$ included in some (anti-)explanation (E, F) of G (i.e. $A \in E \cup F$)?

Necessity: Is a given abducible $A \in \mathcal{A}$ included in every (anti-)explanation of G ?

Since the existence of (anti-)explanations implies the existence of minimal (anti-)explanations, deciding the existence of a minimal (anti-)explanation is as hard

as deciding the existence of an arbitrary one. Similarly, considering minimal (anti-) explanations instead of arbitrary ones brings the same result in the necessity problem. By contrast, the relevance problem has different complexity results between arbitrary and minimal (anti-)explanations in general.

To analyze the complexity of each problem, we first introduce a transformation from extended abduction to normal abduction based on the one in Inoue (2000).⁸ This transformation enables us to use the complexity results of normal abduction.

Suppose an abductive program $\langle P, \mathcal{A} \rangle$ where \mathcal{A} consists of abducible facts. We define an abductive program $\langle P', \mathcal{A}' \rangle$ such that

$$P' = (P \setminus \mathcal{A}) \cup \{A \leftarrow \text{not } A' \mid A \in \mathcal{A} \cap P\},$$

$$\mathcal{A}' = (\mathcal{A} \setminus P) \cup \{A' \mid A \in \mathcal{A} \cap P\},$$

where A' 's are ground literals associated with each A and appear nowhere in $P \cup \mathcal{A}$. In the abductive program $\langle P', \mathcal{A}' \rangle$, any abducible in $\mathcal{A} \cap P$ is made non-abducible and a new abducible A' is introduced for each $A \in \mathcal{A} \cap P$. With this setting, the removal of $A \in \mathcal{A} \cap P$ from P is achieved by the introduction of $A' \in \mathcal{A}'$ to P' by the rule $A \leftarrow \text{not } A'$. The next proposition is due to Inoue (2000).⁹

Proposition 6.1 (transformation from extended abduction to normal abduction)

Let $\langle P, \mathcal{A} \rangle$ be an abductive program and G a ground literal.

1. A positive observation G has a (minimal) credulous/skeptical explanation (E, F) with respect to $\langle P, \mathcal{A} \rangle$ under extended abduction iff G has a (minimal) credulous/skeptical explanation $H = E \cup \{A' \mid A \in F\}$ with respect to $\langle P', \mathcal{A}' \rangle$ under normal abduction.
2. A negative observation G has a (minimal) credulous/skeptical anti-explanation (E, F) with respect to $\langle P, \mathcal{A} \rangle$ under extended abduction iff G' has a (minimal) credulous/skeptical explanation $H = E \cup \{A' \mid A \in F\}$ with respect to $\langle P' \cup \{G' \leftarrow \text{not } G\}, \mathcal{A}' \rangle$ under normal abduction, where G' is a ground atom appearing nowhere in $P \cup \mathcal{A}$.

Proof

1. By the definition, an abducible $A \in \mathcal{A} \cap P$ is not in $P \setminus F$ iff $A' \in \mathcal{A}'$ is in $P' \cup \{A' \mid A \in F\}$. Then, $(P \setminus F) \cup E$ has an answer set S iff $P' \cup H$ has an answer set $S \cup \{A' \mid A \in F\}$. Hence, G has a credulous/skeptical explanation (E, F) with respect to $\langle P, \mathcal{A} \rangle$ under extended abduction iff G has a credulous/skeptical explanation $H = E \cup \{A' \mid A \in F\}$ with respect to $\langle P', \mathcal{A}' \rangle$ under normal abduction. In particular, (E, F) is minimal iff $E \cup F$ is minimal iff H is minimal.
2. By Lemma 3.5, G has a (minimal) credulous/skeptical anti-explanation (E, F) with respect to $\langle P, \mathcal{A} \rangle$ under extended abduction iff a positive observation G' has a (minimal) credulous/skeptical explanation (E, F) with respect to

⁸ Recall that by normal abduction we mean abduction which explains a positive observation only by introducing hypotheses.

⁹ The proposition is given in a more general setting in Inoue (2000), but the definition of (anti-) explanations in Inoue (2000) is a bit different from the one in this paper.

$\langle P \cup \{G' \leftarrow \text{not } G\}, \mathcal{A} \rangle$ under extended abduction. Then, the result holds by the part 1 of this proposition.

□

Thus, extended abduction is efficiently converted into normal abduction. On the other hand, normal abduction is captured as a special case of extended abduction. That is, given an abductive program $\langle P, \mathcal{A} \rangle$ and a positive observation G , G has a (minimal) credulous/skeptical explanation E with respect to $\langle P, \mathcal{A} \rangle$ under normal abduction iff G has a (minimal) credulous/skeptical explanation (E, \emptyset) with respect to $\langle P, \mathcal{A} \rangle$ under extended abduction.

We use these results for assessing the complexity of extended abduction.

Proposition 6.2 (complexity results for normal abduction (Eiter et al., 1997))

Given a propositional abductive program $\langle P, \mathcal{A} \rangle$ and a ground positive observation G :

- (a) Deciding if G has a credulous/skeptical explanation is Σ_2^P -complete/ Σ_3^P -complete.
- (b) Deciding if an abducible $A \in \mathcal{A}$ is relevant to some credulous/skeptical explanation (resp. some *minimal* credulous/skeptical explanation) of G is Σ_2^P -complete/ Σ_3^P -complete (resp. Σ_3^P -complete/ Σ_4^P -complete).
- (c) Deciding if an abducible $A \in \mathcal{A}$ is necessary for every (minimal) credulous/skeptical explanation of G is Π_2^P -complete/ Π_3^P -complete.

In particular, when P contains no disjunctive rules (i.e. P is an ELP), the complexity of each problem decreases by one level in the polynomial hierarchy.¹⁰

Theorem 6.3 (complexity results for extended abduction)

Let $\langle P, \mathcal{A} \rangle$ be a propositional abductive program.

1. Given a ground positive observation G :
 - (a) Deciding if G has a credulous/skeptical explanation is Σ_2^P -complete/ Σ_3^P -complete.
 - (b) Deciding if an abducible $A \in \mathcal{A}$ is relevant to some credulous/skeptical explanation (resp. some *minimal* credulous/skeptical explanation) of G is Σ_2^P -complete/ Σ_3^P -complete (resp. Σ_3^P -complete/ Σ_4^P -complete).
 - (c) Deciding if an abducible $A \in \mathcal{A}$ is necessary for every (minimal) credulous/skeptical explanation of G is Π_2^P -complete/ Π_3^P -complete.
2. Given a ground negative observation G :
 - (a) Deciding if G has a credulous/skeptical anti-explanation is Σ_2^P -complete/ Σ_3^P -complete.
 - (b) Deciding if an abducible $A \in \mathcal{A}$ is relevant to some credulous/skeptical anti-explanation (resp. some *minimal* credulous/skeptical anti-explanation) of G is Σ_2^P -complete/ Σ_3^P -complete (resp. Σ_3^P -complete/ Σ_4^P -complete).

¹⁰ In Eiter et al. (1997) the results are reported for normal logic/disjunctive programs, but the same results hold for extended logic/disjunctive programs.

- (c) Deciding if an abducible $A \in \mathcal{A}$ is necessary for every (minimal) credulous/skeptical anti-explanation of G is Π_2^P -complete/ Π_3^P -complete.

In particular, when P contains no disjunctive rules (i.e. P is an ELP), the complexity of each problem decreases by one level in the polynomial hierarchy.

Proof

1. For explaining positive observations, extended abduction includes normal abduction as a special case. Then, the hardness results of (a)–(c) hold by the corresponding decision problems of Proposition 6.2. Since extended abduction is efficiently translated into normal abduction (Proposition 6.1), the membership results hold.
2. Any credulous/skeptical anti-explanation of G with respect to $\langle P, \mathcal{A} \rangle$ is equivalent to a credulous/skeptical explanation of G' with respect to $\langle P \cup \{G' \leftarrow \text{not } G\}, \mathcal{A} \rangle$ (Lemma 3.5). Then, the results hold by the part 1 of this theorem.

□

The complexity results of extended abduction imply the complexity of view updates and theory updates. In what follows, we say that a view update or a theory update has a solution if there is an updated program which fulfills an update request.

Theorem 6.4 (complexity results for view updates)

Let $\langle P, \mathcal{A} \rangle$ be a propositional abductive program which represents a view update problem. Given a ground literal G :

- (a) Deciding if a view update has a solution in an EDP (resp. ELP) P is Σ_3^P -complete (resp. Σ_2^P -complete) for inserting G , and Σ_2^P -complete (resp. NP-complete) for deleting G .
- (b) Deciding if an abducible $A \in \mathcal{A}$ is relevant to a solution of a view update in an EDP (resp. ELP) P is Σ_4^P -complete (resp. Σ_3^P -complete) for inserting G , and Σ_3^P -complete (resp. Σ_2 -complete) for deleting G .
- (c) Deciding if an abducible $A \in \mathcal{A}$ is necessary for every solution of a view update in an EDP (resp. ELP) P is Π_3^P -complete (resp. Π_2^P -complete) for inserting G , and Π_2^P -complete (resp. co-NP-complete) for deleting G .

Proof

(a) Deciding the existence of a solution which accomplishes a view update for inserting (resp. deleting) G is equivalent to the problem of deciding the existence of a skeptical explanation (resp. a credulous anti-explanation) of G with respect to $\langle P, \mathcal{A} \rangle$ (Theorem 4.1). Hence, the result follows by Theorem 6.3-1,2(a). The results of (b) and (c) also follow from the corresponding decision problems of extended abduction of Theorem 6.3-1,2(b),(c). □

Theorem 6.5 (complexity results for theory updates)

Let $\langle P, \mathcal{A} \rangle$ be a propositional abductive program which represents a theory update problem.

Table 1. Complexity results for program updates

Update EDP/ELP	existence	relevance	necessity
view insertion	Σ_3^P/Σ_2^P	Σ_4^P/Σ_3^P	Π_3^P/Π_2^P
view deletion	Σ_2^P/NP	Σ_3^P/Σ_2^P	$\Pi_2^P/\text{co-NP}$
theory update	Σ_2^P/NP	Σ_3^P/Σ_2^P	$\Pi_2^P/\text{co-NP}$
consistency restoration	Σ_2^P/NP	Σ_3^P/Σ_2^P	$\Pi_2^P/\text{co-NP}$

- (a) Deciding if a theory update has a solution in an EDP (resp. ELP) P is Σ_2^P -complete (resp. NP-complete).
- (b) Deciding if an abducible $A \in \mathcal{A}$ is relevant to a solution of a theory update in an EDP (resp. ELP) P is Σ_3^P -complete (resp. Σ_2 -complete).
- (c) Deciding if an abducible $A \in \mathcal{A}$ is necessary for every solution of a theory update in an EDP (resp. ELP) P is Π_2^P -complete (resp. co-NP-complete).

Proof

(a) Deciding the existence of a solution of a theory update is equivalent to the problem of deciding the existence of a credulous anti-explanation of $G = \perp$ with respect to $\langle P, \mathcal{A} \rangle$ (Theorem 5.2). Hence, the result holds by Theorem 6.3-2(a). The results of (b) and (c) also follow from the corresponding decision problems of extended abduction of Theorem 6.3-2(b),(c). \square

Corollary 6.6 (complexity results for consistency restoration)

Let $\langle P, \mathcal{A} \rangle$ be a propositional abductive program which represents an integrity maintenance (or inconsistency removal) problem.

- (a) Deciding if an integrity maintenance (or inconsistency removal) has a solution in an EDP (resp. ELP) is Σ_2^P -complete (resp. NP-complete).
- (b) Deciding if an abducible $a \in \mathcal{A}$ is relevant to a solution of an integrity maintenance (or inconsistency removal) in an EDP (resp. ELP) is Σ_3^P -complete (resp. Σ_2 -complete).
- (c) Deciding if an abducible $a \in \mathcal{A}$ is necessary for every solution of an integrity maintenance (or inconsistency removal) in an EDP (resp. ELP) is Π_2^P -complete (resp. co-NP-complete).

Proof

Since integrity maintenance or inconsistency removal is characterized as a special case of view deletion or theory update, the decision problems of these tasks have the same complexities as the corresponding problems of view deletion or theory update. \square

The complexity results are summarized in Table 1. In the table, every entry represents completeness for the respective class. Also, consistency restoration means integrity maintenance or inconsistency removal.

These complexity results show that decision problems for view insertion are generally harder than those of view deletion by one level of the polynomial hierarchy,

while problems for theory updates and consistency restoration are as hard as those for view deletion.

7 Related work

There are a large number of studies which concern (normal) abduction and updates in logic programs and deductive databases. In this section, we mainly discuss comparison with studies which handle *nonmonotonic* logic programs or deductive databases with negation.

7.1 Abduction

There are a number of procedures for computing normal abduction. Studies (Eshghi and Kowalski, 1989; Kakas and Mancarella, 1990a; Decker, 1996; Denecker and de Schreye, 1998) introduce top-down procedures for normal abduction. Top-down procedures efficiently compute abduction in a goal-driven manner, and the above procedures are correct for locally stratified NLPs. In unstratified programs, however, top-down (abductive) procedures are generally incorrect under the stable model semantics. By contrast, there exist correct top-down procedures in unstratified programs under different semantics. For instance, Dung (1991) shows that Eshghi and Kowalski's abductive procedure is correct with respect to the *preferred extensions*. Brogi *et al.* (1995) extend Kakas and Mancarella's procedure to extended logic programs, which works correctly under the *three-valued stable model semantics*. Alferes *et al.* (1999) propose a tabled procedure for normal abduction under the *well-founded semantics*. These procedures compute positive explanations for positive observations in the context of normal abduction, while negative explanations or anti-explanations in extended abduction are not directly computed by these procedures. On the other hand, Console *et al.* (1991) and Fung & Kowalski (1997) provide bottom-up procedures which compute normal abduction through Clark's program completion. Using program completion, one can compute anti-explanations by treating the negative observation p as $\neg p$ for the atom p in the completion formula. However, these procedures are also restricted to programs where completion is well-defined.

The approach taken in this paper is based on the computation of answer sets, which is executed in a bottom-up manner. This is the so-called *answer set programming* (ASP) which attracts much attention recently (Marek and Truszczyński, 1999; Niemelä, 1999; Lifschitz, 2002). Some researchers apply ASP to computing normal abduction. Inoue & Sakama (1996) introduce a procedure for normal abduction, which is based on the bottom-up fixpoint computation of extended disjunctive programs. Eiter *et al.* (1999) develop the system called *d1v* which has a front-end for abductive diagnoses in normal disjunctive programs. These two studies use program transformations from abductive programs to disjunctive programs and find credulous (minimal) explanations of normal abduction using bottom-up computation of answer sets or stable models. This paper introduced a program transformation from abductive programs to update programs, but it is different

from these studies in the following points. First, update programs are prepared for extended abduction and can compute negative (anti-)explanations as well as positive ones. Second, we provide methods of computing both credulous and skeptical (minimal) explanations through update programs. Satoh & Iwayama (1991) provide a transformation from abductive programs to normal logic programs under the stable model semantics, and Toni & Kowalski (1995) provide another transformation under the *argumentation framework*. These transformations are applied to normal abduction and do not consider disjunctive programs.

Update programs are simple and applied to a broader class of abductive programs, and extended abduction is realized by any procedure for computing answer sets of EDPs.¹¹ Moreover, since extended abduction includes normal abduction as a special case, update programs are also used for computing normal abduction in EDPs. To compute extended abduction, Inoue & Sakama (1999) introduced a *transaction program* which is a set of production rules to compute (anti-)explanations by fixpoint construction. The procedure works correctly in acyclic covered NLPs. Inoue (2000) introduces a simple program transformation from extended abduction to normal abduction in general EDPs. Using the transformation, extended abduction is executed via normal abduction.

7.2 View update

In deductive databases, update requests on view definitions are considered observations and extensional facts are identified with abducible hypotheses. Then, abduction is viewed as the process of identifying possible changes on extensional facts. Early studies which realize view updating through abduction are based on this idea (Kakas and Mancarella, 1990a; Bry, 1990; Console *et al.*, 1995; Decker, 1996). However, existing approaches characterize the view update problem using normal abduction, which result in somewhat indirect formulations for representing fact removal or view deletion. For instance, Kakas and Mancarella (1990a) realize the deletion of a fact A by the introduction of a new atom A^* which represents *not* A together with the integrity constraints $\leftarrow A, A^*$ and $A \vee A^*$. Bry (1990) specifies the deletion of a fact A using the meta-predicate $new(\neg A)$. Console *et al.* (1995) realize the deletion of a fact A by the insertion of $\neg A$ under program completion. Bry and Console *et al.* handle normal logic programs, so that this conversion causes no problem. However, deleting A and inserting $\neg A$ have different effects when the background program contains negative facts explicitly as in extended logic programs.

Procedurally, Kakas & Mancarella (1990a) and Console *et al.* (1995) separate the process of view updating into two-steps; computing abductive explanations in the intensional database and updating base facts in the extensional database. Such a separation is effective to reduce the cost of extensional database accesses, while it does not reflect the current state of the extensional database and may lead to

¹¹ In implementation, some restrictions on programs such as function-free and range-restricted conditions would be necessary.

redundant computation. For instance, consider the program:

$$\begin{aligned} p &\leftarrow a_1, b, \\ &\dots \\ p &\leftarrow a_k, b, \\ a_1 &\leftarrow \dots, a_k \leftarrow . \end{aligned}$$

where a_i ($i = 1, \dots, k$) and b are extensional facts. Given the update request to insert p , Kakas & Mancarella (1990a) and Console *et al.* (1995) compute k minimal explanations $\{a_1, b\}, \dots, \{a_k, b\}$ in the intensional database, which are evaluated in the extensional database. Such computation is unnecessary and ineffective, since $\{b\}$ is the unique minimal explanation of p . Decker (1996) introduces an improved version of the abductive procedure which avoids such redundant computation by including base facts in the input of refutation processes. However, Decker (1996) does not take base facts into account during the consistency derivations. As a result, it often fails to obtain correct solutions (Mayol and Teniente, 1999). Abductive procedures of Kakas & Mancarella (1990a) and Decker (1996) are top-down and the correctness is guaranteed for locally stratified NLPs. Similarly, view updating based on SLDNF-like top-down procedures (Decker, 1990; Guessoum and Lloyd, 1990; Guessoum and Lloyd, 1991; Teniente and Olive, 1995) have restrictions on the program syntax. By contrast, our method is based on the computation of answer sets, which is executed in a bottom-up manner and is applicable to any EDP. Bry (1990) and Console *et al.* (1995) also compute view updates in a bottom-up manner. The former specifies update procedures in a meta-program and the latter uses Clark's completion. They realize view updates in normal logic programs and do not handle disjunctions nor explicit negation in a program. For updating disjunctive programs, Grant *et al.* (1993) and Fernandez *et al.* (1996) provide algorithms for view updates in propositional NDPs. The former provides a top-down algorithm to compute view updates in stratified disjunctive programs, while the latter achieves view updates in NDPs by bottom-up computation. Fernandez *et al.* (1996) first compute all possible models from the Herbrand base of extensional facts, then minimal models that satisfy updates are constructed from those models. By contrast, we compute the answer sets of an update program and select the U-minimal ones, which is usually a much smaller set and is easier than Fernandez *et al.* (1996).

In deductive databases, integrity maintenance is often coupled with view updating (Mayol and Teniente, 1999). Concerning studies which handle integrity maintenance in nonmonotonic logic programs, Teniente & Olive (1995) and Decker (1996) merge transactions of view updates and integrity maintenance in SLDNF-like top-down procedures. These procedures are sound, and Teniente & Olive (1995) is also complete for computing view updates satisfying integrity constraints in locally stratified logic programs. Abductive procedures in Kakas & Mancarella (1990b), Brogi *et al.* (1995) and Toni & Kowalski (1995) also check integrity constraints in the process of computing candidate hypotheses. Compared with these studies, our approach in section 4.2 is based on the computation of answer sets and is applicable to non-stratified, disjunctive, and extended logic programs.

7.3 Theory update

Fagin *et al.* (1983) formalize theory updates for inserting/deleting a single sentence to/from a first-order theory. According to their definition, a theory T accomplishes the insertion of the sentence σ if $\sigma \in T$, while T accomplishes the deletion of σ if $\sigma \notin Th(T)$ where $Th(\cdot)$ is the set of sentences proved by T . These definitions of insertion and deletion are not symmetric, i.e. derived sentences are taken into consideration in deletion, while they are not considered in insertion. In fact, if deletion is defined by $\sigma \notin Th(T)$, it seems natural to define insertion also by $\sigma \in Th(T)$. In this paper, we achieve updates on derived facts by view updates, while explicit insertion/deletion of a sentence itself is distinguished as theory updates in section 5.1. Our Definition 5.1 is symmetric for insertion and deletion of sentences. Fagin *et al.*'s update semantics is also characterized by extended abduction in Inoue & Sakama (1995), hence it is computable via update programs. In Fagin *et al.* (1986) they extended the framework to updating a theory by several sentences. The definition of their *batch insertion* is close to the definition of our theory update of Definition 5.2. A difference is that they handle first-order theories, while we consider nonmonotonic logic programs. Moreover, they provide no computational method to realize theory updates.

Alferes *et al.* (2000) introduce the framework of *dynamic logic programming* which realizes theory updates in nonmonotonic logic programs. They represent updates using meta-rules which specify changes between different states, and the result of update is reflected by the stable models of the updated program. Compared with our framework, Alferes *et al.* (2000) compute stable models of an updated program but do not compute an updated program at the object level. Moreover, the effect of updates is also different from ours. In Example 5.1, updating P_1 with a series of updates P_2 and P_4 results in the program which has the answer set $\{\neg power_failure, sleep\}$. Interestingly, however, starting from the same knowledge base and applying the same updates,¹² Alferes *et al.* (2000) revive the original program P_1 and concludes $\{tv_on, watch_tv\}$. Thus, after power is back up again, TV automatically works and a person watches TV in Alferes *et al.*'s approach, while this is not the case in our semantics. This difference comes from the fact that Alferes *et al.* (2000) consider that every rule/fact in the initial program P_1 persistently holds unless it is forced to be false by updates. Besides, persistent sentences once rejected by an update revive when the update is later invalidated. However, such a persistent assumption works too strong in many situations.¹³ For instance, consider the following scenario. "A person planned to go to a concert on this Friday's evening and reserved a seat. After a while, however, a meeting was scheduled with his client on that day, so he canceled the reservation. On Friday morning, there is a call from the client that she will be absent from the meeting because of illness." The situation is described as follows. The initial situation is

$$Q_1 : seat_reserved \leftarrow .$$

¹² Alferes *et al.* (2000) use default negation *not* instead of explicit negation \neg in the head of rules.

¹³ They call it the 'principle of inertia', but the assumption is stronger than the law of inertia in the usual sense.

Updating Q_1 with

$$Q_2 : \quad \neg \text{seat_reserved} \leftarrow \text{cancel_reservation}, \\ \text{cancel_reservation} \leftarrow \text{meeting_scheduled}, \\ \text{meeting_scheduled} \leftarrow$$

amounts to the new program Q_2 . Next, updating Q_2 with

$$Q_3 : \quad \neg \text{meeting_scheduled} \leftarrow \text{meeting_canceled}, \\ \text{meeting_canceled} \leftarrow \text{client_absent}, \\ \text{client_absent} \leftarrow,$$

results in the program $(Q_2 \cup Q_3) \setminus \{\text{meeting_scheduled} \leftarrow\}$, which has the answer set $\{\text{client_absent}, \text{meeting_canceled}, \neg \text{meeting_scheduled}\}$. On the other hand, according to Alferes *et al.* (2000), the fact in Q_1 revives after updating Q_2 with Q_3 . As a result, it automatically recovers cancelled reservation after the client's call, which is unintuitive. In real life, once a state has changed by an update, the state is not always recovered again just by cancelling the effect of an update. A knowledge base generally contains persistent knowledge and temporary knowledge, and it is important to distinguish them. Back to the TV example, if tv_on holds by default whenever the power is supplied, it is represented as a default rule

$$tv_on \leftarrow not\ power_failure.$$

In this case, we have the same result as Alferes *et al.* (2000) after updates.

Alferes *et al.* (2002) propose a language called *LUPS* for specifying changes to logic programs. It realizes a theory update by a series of update commands which are translated into a normal logic program written in a meta-language under the stable model semantics. Using *LUPS*, persistent/non-persistent rules are distinguished by the commands *always/assert*, which are respectively cancelled by *cancel/retract*. For instance, the situation in the above example is expressed as

$$\text{assert } seat_reserved. \\ \text{retract } seat_reserved \text{ when } meeting_scheduled.$$

Then, reservation is cancelled when meeting is scheduled, and the reservation is never recovered just by cancelling the meeting. Compared with their approach, update programs considered in this paper specify changes at the object level. Moreover, our update programs are used for computing not only theory updates but also view updates.

Eiter *et al.* (2000) reformulate the approach of Alferes *et al.* (2000) and introduce update programs which have the same effect as dynamic logic programs. They also introduce minimal and strict updates in an update sequence. For instance, consider the program sequence:

$$P_1 : \quad a \leftarrow, \\ P_2 : \quad \neg a \leftarrow not\ c, \\ P_3 : \quad c \leftarrow not\ d, \quad d \leftarrow not\ c.$$

First, updating P_1 by P_2 has the single answer set $\{\neg a\}$ as the solution. Next, updating P_2 by P_3 has two answer sets $S_1 = \{c\}$ and $S_2 = \{-a, d\}$. Among these two, S_1 is consistent with $P_1 \cup P_2$, while S_2 is inconsistent with P_1 then P_1 is rejected. In this case, S_1 is called *minimal* with respect to historical changes, and is preferred to S_2 . A *strict* update further takes the temporal order of updates into consideration. Our theory updates just consider the minimal change between the current knowledge base and the new one, and do not take the history of updates into consideration. In the above example, our theory updates produce the program $P_2 \cup P_3$ and both S_1 and S_2 are the solutions. However, the selection of minimal updates with respect to historical changes is not always intuitive. For instance, consider the scenario: First, a person planned to join a party as she had no schedule on that day (P_1). After a while, she got a job which must be done by that day. If she is not free due to the job, she cannot join the party (P_2). Now, the party is tomorrow. But she does not know whether she can finish the job before the party (P_3). The scenario is represented by the program sequence:

$$\begin{aligned} P_1 : \quad & \text{join_party} \leftarrow, \\ P_2 : \quad & \neg \text{join_party} \leftarrow \text{not free}, \\ P_3 : \quad & \text{free} \leftarrow \text{not busy}, \\ & \text{busy} \leftarrow \text{not free}, \end{aligned}$$

which have the same structure as the preceding example. In this case, there seems no reason to prefer $\{\text{join_party}, \text{free}\}$ to $\{\neg \text{join_party}, \text{busy}\}$, since according to the latest information P_3 it is not known whether *free* or *busy*. Eiter *et al.*'s approach is based on the *causal rejection principle* which states that an old rule r is discarded by a more recent rule r' only if r contradicts r' . The causal rejection principle resolves contradiction between old and new programs, but does not resolve contradiction which arises in a program. For instance, updating the program $P_1 = \{q \leftarrow, \neg q \leftarrow a\}$ with $P_2 = \{a \leftarrow\}$ has no solution by the causal rejection principle, while we have solutions by removing one of the two rules in P_1 .

Buccafurri *et al.* (1999) introduce an *inheritance program* which consists of a set of EDPs ordered by a generality relation. It realizes default reasoning in inheritance hierarchies and is also applied to updating logic programs. According to Eiter *et al.* (2000), inheritance programs are equivalent to update programs of Eiter *et al.*'s, hence the same arguments as the comparison with update programs are applied.

Zhang and Foo (1998) study theory updates between ELPs. When updating P_1 with P_2 , they first update each answer set S of P_1 with P_2 . The result of this update, S' , is a set of ground literals which has minimal difference from S and satisfies each rule in P_2 . Next, a maximal subset $P' \subseteq P_1$ is extracted such that S' is a subset of an answer set of $P' \cup P_2$. When there is a conflict between rules in P' and P_2 , a higher priority is put on rules in P_2 and those rules are selected in the resulting program. Our theory update is different from theirs in both the method and the result. First, their update consists of a series of transactions: computation of the answer sets of the original program, updates on these answer sets, extraction of rules from the original program, merging two programs, and conflict resolution based on

preference. By contrast, we perform a theory update in a much simpler manner by translating a program into an update program and computing the U-minimal answer sets of the update program. Second, conflict resolution taken in their approach often has an effect which seems too strong. As pointed out by Eiter *et al.* (2000), updating $P_1 = \{p \leftarrow \text{not } q\}$ with $P_2 = \{q \leftarrow \text{not } p\}$ results in P_2 , even though $P_1 \cup P_2$ is consistent. In our framework, the result of update is $P_1 \cup P_2$.

Decker (1997) provides an abductive procedure for computing both *user updates* and *schema updates* in normal logic programs. User updates correspond to view updates, while schema updates consider updating a theory with a rule. The procedure is top-down and works correctly for locally stratified programs. Studies (Boutilier and Becher, 1995; Boutilier, 1996; Lobo and Uzcátegui, 1996) characterize belief update/revision based on normal abduction in monotonic propositional theories. These approaches are the so-called ‘interpretation updates’ and compute updates in terms of individual models of a theory. This is in contrast to our theory updates which computes updates directly by a program.

To resolve inconsistency in a nonmonotonic logic program, Pereira *et al.* (1991) introduce a method of contradiction removal in extended logic programs. When conflicting conclusions are brought by a program, they prefer a conclusion that does not depend on any default assumption. This method does not resolve inconsistency in a program of Example 5.4, where contradiction is brought by no default assumption. Damásio & Pereira (1995) use abduction to resolve inconsistency in ELPs. When a program derives contradiction, it is resolved by changing the truth value of abducible literals from true to false or undefined under the well-founded semantics. Yuan & You (1998) formalize the same problem by a three-valued semantics and resolve inconsistency in ELPs using a suitable program transformation. In their approach, the revised programs contain newly introduced literals. These studies use three-valued semantics and have different handling of inconsistency in general. For instance, the rule $p \leftarrow \text{not } p$ makes a program inconsistent under the answer set semantics, while p is interpreted undefined under the well-founded semantics. Syntactically, the above studies do not handle programs containing disjunctions. Witteveen & van der Hoek (1997) consider a *back-up semantics* when the intended semantics fails to provide a consistent meaning to a program. For instance, when a program is inconsistent under the stable model semantics, they consider the minimal model semantics as a back-up semantics. Then, the program is made consistent by introducing some sentences which are supported by the back-up semantics. In this approach two different semantics are considered on the same program and the result of revision depends on the choice of a back-up semantics. Moreover, it does not resolve contradiction in the type of program of Example 5.4.

Inoue (1994) characterizes inconsistency resolution in an ELP P by the abductive program $\langle \emptyset, P \rangle$. Then, he considers a maximal consistent subset of the hypotheses P , which is computed using a program transformation from the abductive program to an ELP. We characterized the same problem by the abductive program $\langle P, P \rangle$ in section 5.3, but the result is the same as Inoue (1994) for ELPs. The problem is also characterized by the abductive program $\langle P, \mathcal{L}_P \rangle$ in Inoue & Sakama (1995). This formulation, however, produces different results in general. For instance, given

the inconsistent program $P = \{\neg p \leftarrow, \leftarrow not p\}$, $\langle P, \mathcal{L}_P \rangle$ has the minimal explanation $(\{p\}, \{\neg p\})$ which produces the updated program $\{p \leftarrow, \leftarrow not p\}$. On the other hand, $\langle P, P \rangle$ has the minimal explanation $(\{\}, \{\leftarrow not p\})$ and the result of update is $\{\neg p \leftarrow\}$. Thus, $\langle P, \mathcal{L}_P \rangle$ permits the introduction of new facts as well as the deletion of facts to resolve inconsistency. Generally, permitting introduction of sentences increases the number of possible solutions. Nevertheless, this type of inconsistency resolution is also realized by computing consistent U-minimal answer sets of the update program of $\langle P, \mathcal{L}_P \rangle$.

7.4 Belief revision

Update is often distinguished from (*belief*) *revision* (Katsuno and Mendelzon, 1991). That is, update targets the problem of changing one's belief up to date when the (external) world changes. By contrast, revision handles the problem of modifying one's belief when new information about the static world is obtained (while the external world does not change). In this paper we handled the problem of view updates and theory updates, both of which are caused by the change of the external world in general. A question is then whether the present approach is also applicable to revision. Our position on this point is as follows. It is true that the distinction between update and revision is useful in some contexts, however, we do not consider that such a distinction is always possible. For instance, recall the bird-fly example in section 1.2:

$$\begin{aligned} flies(x) &\leftarrow bird(x), not ab(x), \\ ab(x) &\leftarrow broken-wing(x), \\ bird(tweety) &\leftarrow, \\ broken-wing(tweety) &\leftarrow. \end{aligned}$$

When we observe that tweety flies, the program is updated by deleting the fact $broken-wing(tweety)$, for instance. Is this belief change is update or revision? On one hand, it is considered that the external world has changed – tweety has healed; on the other hand, it is considered that the external world never changes, but the reasoner has a wrong (initial) belief – $broken-wing(tweety)$.

As this example indicates, the same problem is captured from different viewpoints. Only by observing new evidence, one cannot judge in general whether it comes from the change of the (external) world or not. Moreover, some researchers argue that revision is viewed as update of mental states (del Val and Shoham, 1994). In this sense, we do not strictly distinguish update and revision in this paper.

Katsuno & Mendelzon (1991) distinguish update and revision in the context of propositional theories, and introduce postulates to distinguish them. We do not examine these postulates in our update framework, but those postulates are defined for monotonic propositional theories and, as argued in Eiter *et al.* (2000), they are not applicable to nonmonotonic updates in general. Katsuno and Mendelzon also argue that inconsistency in a knowledge base is resolved by revision rather than update. However, we often have inconsistent information in daily life, and resolve

inconsistency by acquiring more accurate information. This process is captured as an update of one's mental state. Inconsistency removal considered in this paper is an example of this type of updates.

8 Conclusion

This paper introduced an abductive framework for computing various update problems in nonmonotonic logic programs. The first contribution of this paper is a computational method for extended abduction through update programs. Update programs are extended disjunctive programs which are obtained by a simple program transformation from abductive programs. Then, (minimal) credulous/skeptical (anti-)explanations of positive/negative observations are computed by the (U-minimal) answer sets of an update program. The second contribution of this paper is characterizations of view updates and theory updates in terms of extended abduction. Extended abduction is suitable for formalizing information changes in nonmonotonic theories, and different types of updates are computed by the U-minimal answer sets of update programs in a uniform manner. Using update programs, computation of updates is realized on top of the existing procedures for answer set programming with the additional mechanism of selecting U-minimal answer sets.

It has been widely recognized that abduction plays an important role in updating data and knowledge bases. The advantage of the present paper lies in its capability of uniform treatment of different types of theory changes as well as in its syntactic generality of the language. Formalizing various update problems in a single framework clarifies the difference of each update, and implies the possibility of integrating them. For instance, integrity maintenance and inconsistency removal are captured as special cases of view updates and theory updates, respectively. Then, consistency restoration is done as a sub-task of the corresponding update procedure. Further, it is possible to execute view updates and theory updates in a combined manner. For instance, suppose a knowledge base K which consists of the invariable part K_1 and the variable part K_2 . Then, an update on K_1 is done by view updates and an update on K_2 is done by theory updates. View updates and theory updates have been respectively studied in the field of databases and AI, but their combinations are not exploited in the literature due to different formulations. Thanks to the uniform treatment of this paper, we could provide a theoretical basis for such mixed types of updates.

There is a trade-off between syntactic generality of the framework and the efficiency of the computational mechanism. Our abductive/update framework is general in the sense that it is applicable to any extended disjunctive program, while its computation is inefficient as it requires computing every answer set of an update program. As discussed in section 7.1, goal-driven abduction does not produce correct answers in unstratified programs under the answer set semantics. On the other hand, the framework of extended abduction is independent of a particular semantics, so that abductive updates considered in this paper could be formulated under different semantics which has a correct top-down procedure. From the complexity viewpoints, general update problems have very high complexity and are intractable in general

(unless $P = NP$). Further, the update program UP uses unstratified negation in $abd(\cdot)$, so that it is not evaluated efficiently even when the objective program P is a stratified (normal) program. (When a program P is a disjunctive program, replacing $abd(a)$ with the disjunctive fact $a; \bar{a}$ does not introduce unstratified negation to UP as presented in section 3.1.) One solution to avoid using unstratified negation is provided by Inoue (2000) which introduces a simple translation from extended abduction to normal abduction. (The idea of this translation is presented in section 6.) This translation keeps minimal (anti-)explanations, while it preserves the stratified structure of programs. An alternative formalization of update problems based on this transformation is left for future study.

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