A Formal Account of Deception
Chiaki Sakama
Proceedings of the AAAI Fall 2015 Symposium on Deceptive and Counter-Deceptive Machines,
Technical Report FS-15-03, AAAI Press, pages 34-41, 2015.
Abstract
This paper studies a formal account of deception using a dynamic epistemic logic.
Three different types of deception are considered: deception by lying,
deception by bluffing and deception by truth-telling,
depending on whether a speaker believes what he/she says or not.
Next several situations are considered where an act of deceiving happens.
Intentional deception is accompanied by a speaker's intent to deceive.
Indirect deception happens when false information is carried over from person to person.
Self-deception is an act of deceiving the self.
The current study formally characterizes various aspects of deception
that have been informally argued in philosophical literature.
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